Indiana Law Journal
Volume 93

Issue 2

Article 3

Spring 2018

Fourth Amendment Localism
Wayne A. Logan
Florida State University College of Law, wlogan@law.fsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Logan, Wayne A. (2018) "Fourth Amendment Localism," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 93 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol93/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Fourth Amendment Localism*
WAYNE A. LOGAN†
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 370
I. SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM .............................................................. 376
A. SUBSTANTIVE LAW ............................................................................. 377
B. GEOGRAPHY ........................................................................................ 379
C. RESOURCES ......................................................................................... 381
II. THE LOCALISTS ............................................................................................ 382
A. “NEW DEMOCRATISTS” ....................................................................... 383
B. “NEW ADMINISTRATIVISTS” ................................................................ 386
C. SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 389
III. ASSESSING LOCALISM’S LIMITS .................................................................. 391
A. TAILORING .......................................................................................... 391
B. EXPERIMENTATION .............................................................................. 399
C. TIEBOUT SORTING AND EXTERNALITIES ............................................... 404
IV. WHITHER FOURTH AMENDMENT LOCALISM ................................................. 408
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONALISM .............................................. 409
1. INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS .............................................................. 409
2. STRUCTURAL DEMOCRATIC INTERESTS ........................................ 411
3. COMPARATIVE DISTINCTIVENESS ................................................ 413
B. “LEVELING UP” FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE ................................ 416
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 419

* Copyright © 2018 Wayne A. Logan.
† Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
Thanks to Joseph Blocher, Paul Cassell, Barry Friedman, Rachel Harmon, Orin Kerr, David
Logan, Dave Markell, Richard Re, Erin Ryan, Chris Slobogin, Franita Tolson, Sam Wiseman,
and Ron Wright for their very helpful comments.

370

INDIA NA LA W J OUR NA L

[Vol. 93:369

INTRODUCTION
American policing, like American politics,1 is a decidedly local affair.2 While the
image of federal “G-Men” might preoccupy the public imagination, in reality, local
police have long dominated law enforcement,3 reflecting the needs, values, and characteristics of the communities they serve,4 under circumstances “inextricably enmeshed in local politics.”5
Over time, however, local responsiveness has been tempered by two countervailing forces. The first was the movement, beginning in the 1930s,6 to professionalize
police forces and decouple departments from local political influence.7 The second
has been the Supreme Court’s effort to exert federal constitutional control over state
and local police, allowing the Court to confidently proclaim in 1961 that the Fourth
Amendment was “enforceable in the same manner and to like effect” nationwide.8
Of late, however, several leading criminal justice scholars have urged a different
course, arguing that policing needs more, not less, local political influence, and that
local preferences are deserving of judicial deference. One group, which I call the
“New Democratists” because they inspire historic parallel to Jeffersonian ideals of
localized, small-scale participatory governance in “little republics,”9 advocates judi-

1. See THOMAS P. O’NEIL & GARY HYMEL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL AND OTHER RULES OF
THE GAME (1994).

2. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 870, 877 (2015) (“[P]olice departments are overwhelmingly funded by local governments
and governed by the local political process. Localism may be American policing’s most
distinctive characteristic.”).
3. See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN
INTRODUCTION 62–63 (7th ed. 2011) (noting that of the roughly 18,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide, almost 13,000 are local, rather than county, state, or federal).
4. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 1.10(c) (4th ed. 2015) (“[T]he criminal justice system was structured from the
outset to ensure that the administration of the criminal law was responsive to the views of the
local community. . . . [B]road grants of discretionary authority provided substantial leeway for
administrative variations that reflected the differences in local communities.”).
5. EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO
1898, at 638 (1999); see also William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct,
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 665, 665 (2002) (“The defining characteristic of American criminal
law enforcement—the characteristic that most distinguishes it from law enforcement elsewhere
in the developed world—is its localism.”).
6. ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 219–68 (1977); DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY,
DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 38 (2008); NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE &
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON POLICE 1–5 (1931).
7. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Police and Their Problems: A Theory, 12 PUB. POL’Y
189, 191 (1963) (criticizing “political meddling . . . facilitated by local control of police forces”).
8. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
9. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 2 ADAMSJEFFERSON LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS 390 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959); see also KERMIT HALL, THE MAGIC
MIRROR 64 (1989) (observing that in the Framing Era “republicanism” commonly was “equated
[with] localism and decentralization of power”).

2018]

F OUR TH A ME NDME NT LOCA LISM

371

cial deference to laws and policies resulting from local democratic processes. According to the chief proponents of this view, Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey
Meares, constitutional regulation of discretionary policing should reflect “the values
and insights of the communities in which such policing is taking place.”10 More recently, Professor Andrew Taslitz argued that “Fourth Amendment law should vary
based on geographic concerns,” because otherwise there comes risk of “silencing”
local political sentiment, especially that of poor urban minority communities.11
Another group, building upon the earlier work of Professor Anthony Amsterdam
and others,12 which Professor Andrew Crespo has referred to as the “burgeoning”
group of “New Administravists,”13 urges localization but looks less to direct democracy than administrative rule making by local governments. Scholars in this camp
maintain that courts, instead of assessing the substantive constitutional merits of a
policy, should ask whether the process undertaken to craft the policy satisfied prerequisites of administrative rule making, such as public notice and comment procedures.14 According to Professors Christopher Slobogin15 and Barry Friedman,16
among others,17 shifting the policy-making locus is sensible both because police departments are in fact executive agencies and doing so will promote governmental
transparency, democratic accountability, and public engagement.18

10. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1184 (1998); see also Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The
Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 197; cf. Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1418 (2017) (“Democratic localism is essential for the proper
functioning of the criminal system because the criminal justice principles embodying substantive
constitutional norms can only be defined through community interactions at the local level.”).
11. Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of the American
Poor, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277, 279 (2010).
12. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
416–28 (1974); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52
TEX. L. REV. 703, 725 (1974); Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative
Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment
Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442 (1990); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70
MICH. L. REV. 659, 690 (1972).
13. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2058–59 (2016).
14. See id. at 2058 (“[T]he model would shift courts from serving as sources of substantive
judicial oversight . . . courts would oversee the procedural validity of law enforcement behavior
by determining whether the decisionmaking and conduct of such actors comply with basic
standards of transparency and democratic accountability.” (emphasis in original)).
15. Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (2016).
16. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827
(2015).
17. E.g., Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515
(2000); Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521 (2015); John Rappaport,
Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205 (2015); Daphna Renan,
The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (2016); Andrew
D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017).
18. See infra notes 151–167 and accompanying text.
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Whether such benefits can actually be achieved remains open to question, given
the significant political process concerns of small-scale governance identified by
Madison19 and the political pathologies known to plague criminal justice policy making more generally.20 Although the Supreme Court has expressed faith in the power
of local political forces to curb police overreach,21 its faith has been tested by realworld occurrences such as the NYPD’s “stop and frisk” policy, targeting mainly poor
and minority neighborhoods,22 and discriminatory policing in Ferguson, Missouri,23
and Baltimore, Maryland.24
Yet even assuming that such difficulties can be overcome, an even more fundamental question looms: should Fourth Amendment norms be localized? This Article
seeks to press the pause button in the ongoing academic commentary and does so by
tapping into legal literatures that have grown alongside (but distinct from) those just
described. Professors David Barron25 and Richard Schragger26 have advocated “local
constitutionalism,” positing the beneficial role that local preferences can play in
shaping federal constitutional norms. Although they acknowledge that localities
themselves are nonsovereign entities27 underserving of constitutional deference in a
formal sense,28 like the criminal justice scholars noted above, they invoke the many
instrumental benefits of decentralization.29

19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 63–64 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(warning of the increased power of “factions” in small democratic units to “execute their plans
of oppression”); see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in
1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 644, 646 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
(expressing same concern).
20. See David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1473
(2014).
21. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001) (attaching importance to the “political accountability[] of most local lawmakers and law-enforcement
officials”).
22. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
23. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–14 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/CB88-VUD8].
24. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download
[https://perma.cc/Y6X9-W6EP].
25. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 561–63 (1999).
26. Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the
Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004).
27. See, e.g., David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J.
377, 390 (2001) (“As a formal legal matter, the federal Constitution does not treat local governments as anything approximating coequal sovereigns. States have the power to approve and
establish local governments.”).
28. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
29. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 25, at 382 (“There is a value in ensuring that local jurisdictions have the discretion to make the decisions that their residents wish them to make. The
value inheres in the traditional advantages that attend decentralization. These include more
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Similarly, Professor Mark Rosen has urged local “Tailoring” of constitutional
norms.30 Rosen asserts that “One-Size-Fits-All is not an intrinsic part of American
constitutionalism,”31 noting inter alia the “community standards” test employed by
local juries when assessing whether material is obscene for First Amendment purposes.32 Professor Joseph Blocher, in a recent Yale Law Journal article entitled
Firearm Localism, applied the model to the Second Amendment, citing the historic
prevalence of stricter gun control laws in urban areas and the existence of a less restrictive “gun culture” in rural areas.33 Finally, the Supreme Court has often deferred
to local government preference when resolving constitutional questions34 in areas
such as educational policy35 and land use and zoning,36 which, like policing,37 constitute core aspects of local governance.38

participatory and responsive government; more diversity of policy experimentation; more
flexibility in responding to changing circumstances; and more diffusion of governmental
power, which in turn checks tyranny.”).
30. See Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional
Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1636 (2005) [hereinafter Rosen, Surprisingly Strong];
Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional
Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1169 (1999) [hereinafter Rosen,
Nonuniform Constitution].
31. Rosen, Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1636.
32. Rosen, Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 30, at 1150 (citing and discussing
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
33. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 85 (2013) (arguing that
“future Second Amendment cases can and should incorporate the longstanding and sensible
differences regarding guns and gun control in rural and urban areas, giving more protection to
gun rights in rural areas and more leeway to gun regulation in cities”).
34. See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New
Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 218 (1996)
(“Court decisions have recognized the key role of localities without explicitly saying so. This
is particularly true when one considers the federalist values of local decision making, citizen
participation, and responsiveness to diverse community needs, all of which occur far better on
the municipal than on the state level.”).
35. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974) (“[L]ocal control over the
operation of schools . . . has long been thought essential to the maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to the quality of the educational process.”).
36. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002)
(“[T]he Los Angeles City Council is in a better position than the judiciary to gather and evaluate data on local problems.”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 297–98 (2000) (“The
city council members, familiar with commercial downtown Erie . . . can make particularized,
expert judgments about the resulting harmful secondary effects.”).
37. See DANIEL L. SKOLER, ORGANIZING THE NON-SYSTEM: GOVERNMENTAL
STRUCTURING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 77 (1977) (calling policing the most “local” of
all criminal justice activities).
38. See ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY: THE DISTRIBUTION OF
MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SERVICES 10 (1977) (“The services performed by municipalities are those
most vital to the preservation of life (police, fire, sanitation, public health), liberty (police,
courts, prosecutors), property (zoning, planning, taxing), and public enlightenment (schools,
libraries).”).
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If localism works for the First and Second Amendment, and for due process visà-vis educational and land use policy, why not for policing and the Fourth
Amendment doctrine that regulates it? Should localism be constitutionally
transsubstantive, as the Fourth Amendment itself is relative to the substantive criminal law?39 Or, are the privacy and bodily security rights and other critically
important interests that the Fourth Amendment protects sufficiently distinct, such
that they should not be allowed to hinge on the preferences of local political branch
actors?
This Article examines these and other questions and proceeds as follows. Part I
examines the several ways in which Fourth Amendment rights already, as a practical
matter, reflect localism. Variations in substantive criminal law among localities (not
just states), for instance, directly affect the authority of police to search and seize
individuals. So too do geographic differences and resources at the disposal of police
departments.40 As a practical matter, contrary to the common assumption of the
Court41 and commentators,42 Fourth Amendment rights can and already do differ
among localities.
Part II surveys the efforts of the criminal justice scholars noted above—the “New
Democratists” and the “New Administrativists”—that would add to this variation in
a new and significant way. Together, the groups make a compelling case for their
own particular brand of localism: without question, increasing public input on policing policy and promoting governmental accountability and transparency are laudable
goals. There should be no mistaking, however, the radical quality of their proposed
changes. Advocates not only would have the political branches, not courts, be the
primary expositors of limits on police authority.43 They would also have the locus of
constitutional understanding be pushed “all the way down” to local governments,44

39. See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001).
40. See infra Part I.
41. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection,
115 MICH. L. REV. 1117, 1145 (2017) (“The Fourth Amendment is one size-fits-all. A rule that
applies to the Grainfield, Kansas, police department also applies at the FBI Headquarters in
Washington, D.C.”).
43. This is a position recently advanced by some vis-à-vis Congress and state legislatures
regarding police use of emerging technologies that affect privacy interests. E.g., Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004). But see, e.g., Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal
Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law
Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 533–37 (2013) (noting that legislatures are
often dominated by law enforcement interests and the unwillingness of legislatures to amend
“obviously flawed and outdated provisions”).
44. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (2010) (asserting that “localities represent better sites for
pursuing federalism’s values because they are closer to the people, offer more realistic options
for voting with one’s feet, and map more closely into communities of interest.” (emphasis in
original)).
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affording localities not only the power to enforce constitutional norms (itself a controversial proposition),45 but actually to define them.
Part III considers the benefits and detriments of Fourth Amendment localism. To
advocates, a chief virtue of localism lies in its capacity to tailor constitutional norms
to local needs and preferences, resulting in a possible broadening of constitutional
protection.46 History teaches, however, that local government public safety policies,
certainly including policing, can be harsh and repressive, and localism would ascribe
constitutional weight to such policies. More problematic still, in time, local political
actors, mindful that courts will defer if democratic or administrative processes appear
adequate, could well be emboldened to adopt even more repressive policies.
Another potential benefit of localism is that it holds promise of beneficial experimentation, akin to that envisioned by Justice Brandeis, 47 and more recently
invoked by Professors Dorf and Sabel in their model of “democratic
experimentalism.” 48 The benefits of experimentalism, however, hinge on the
wherewithal of policy makers and the subject matter in question. Local
governments number in the tens of thousands49 and vary significantly in their
capabilities and resources.50 This not only raises concern about the quality of
experiments undertaken; it creates conditions ripe for freeriding if localities simply
replicate one another’s policies, which is itself an outcome inconsistent with the
experimentalist enterprise.
Finally, localism might be embraced because it serves to enhance the overall satisfaction of citizens, who as Charles Tiebout famously theorized will choose to
reside in communities that best satisfy their preferences. 51 Indeed, because it is
often easier to exit a locality than a state or nation, localism would appear to have
promise. Yet the comparative ease of relocation is often less than it seems,
especially for poor community members, who frequently bear the brunt of policing
policy. Even more problematic, the Tieboutian model fails to take into account the
propensity of local governments to impose negative externalities on their peers.

45. See Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2012).
46. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 25, at 611 (asserting that “[b]y broadening the range of
permissible constitutional interpreters, local constitutionalism might broaden the range of constitutional protections”).
47. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
48. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
49. Today there are over 90,000 local government units of varied size and nature.
CARMA HOGUE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION SUMMARY REPORT:
2012 (2013), http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V7JQDNC].
50. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, DAWN CLARK NETSCH, PETER W. SALSICH, J R. &
JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 32 (5th ed.
2002) (“A basic fact about local governments in the United States is their great diversity
with respect to such matters as legal nature, size, area, functions, and organizations, both
within and among states . . . .”).
51. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416
(1956).
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Unlike taxes, public parks, and other local public goods, criminal justice policy
(including policing) can be motivated by a desire to expel or discourage entry of
individuals, which raises race-to-the-bottom concerns.
Part IV considers whether Fourth Amendment localism is nevertheless viable
in some shape or form. 52 It makes the case that the Fourth Amendment is not a
good candidate, highlighting the many important ways in which the cluster of
rights it protects differs in kind from other Bill of Rights provisions, the First and
Second Amendments in particular. Judicial deference becomes even more
problematic when one considers that the Supreme Court has long refused to
second-guess political branch decisions concerning the reach of criminal codes,53
which enable and condition the authority of police to search and seize individuals.54
Given this exceptionalism, if localism is to have a place anywhere in constitutional norm making it should be in elevating the scope of Fourth Amendment protections afforded individuals. Doing so would avoid the many difficulties created by
unqualified localism, such as when an individual travels to a right-restrictive locality
and, without notice, is subject to a diminution in Fourth Amendment rights. It would
also achieve the many instrumental benefits of localism, such as public participation,
governmental accountability, and transparency. Under the more circumscribed approach advocated, no dilution of individual rights would occur; indeed, if the local
experiment caught on with other localities, there would be an aggregate increase in
constitutional protection. While effectuating such a change would not be free of difficulty, it would enable Fourth Amendment doctrine to secure the benefits of localism yet avoids its many pitfalls.
I. SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Since the nation’s origin, a tenet of federal constitutional law has been that rights
apply uniformly nationwide,55 avoiding “arbitrarily variable protection.”56 To allow
otherwise would “change the uniform ‘law of the land’ into a crazy quilt,”57 leading
to “jarring and discordant judgements” that Justice Story thought “deplorable.”58

52. As Robert Mikos has observed, “[T]he case for or against localism is rarely as clear
cut as in the highly stylized hypothetical commonly employed in the classroom.” Robert A.
Mikos, Marijuana Localism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 719, 726 (2015).
53. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (refusing to identify when a
criminal code might become so “exorbitant” as to justify constitutional regulation).
54. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)
(averring the “necessity of uniformity” regarding federal constitutional matters); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 38–39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[W]e have uniformly
been one people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, protection.”).
56. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004).
57. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also State v.
Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 816 (N.J. 1990) (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The fourth amendment is the fourth amendment. It ought not to mean one thing in Trenton
and another across the Delaware River in Morrisville, Pennsylvania.”).
58. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816) (Story, J.).
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In reality, however, federal constitutional rights, perhaps especially in the Fourth
Amendment context, have always varied.59 Evidence of this dates back to the
Framing Era, when the search and seizure authority of federal agents depended on
the preferences of first colonial and then state governments.60 Today, subnational
variation stems from a variety of sources, including the differing views of courts.
While state and lower federal courts must defer to the nation’s “one Supreme
Court,”61 they can vary on Fourth Amendment questions not decided by the Court.62
And even with matters ostensibly decided by the Court, lower courts have interpretative latitude.63
In sum, Fourth Amendment law resembles something less that an invariable
judge-made “detailed code of criminal procedure.”64 This Part elaborates on this empiric reality, and does so by shifting focus, examining the many even more organic
ways, from the bottom up, that police search and seizure authority—and thus the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens—can vary.
A. Substantive Law
Criminal codes at once reflect the normative preferences of a jurisdiction and
condition the search and seizure authority of its police. As Professor Wayne
LaFave long ago recognized, “the substantive criminal law is not merely a list of
‘thou-shall-nots’ directed at the citizenry; it is also in large measure a definition of

59. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008) (noting that “[n]onuniformity
is . . . an unavoidable reality in a federalist system” and asserting that a “fundamental interest”
exists in preserving subnational authority that cannot be constrained by “any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity”).
60. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY
L.J. 1229 (2015).
61. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160
(1825) (“[T]he construction given by this Court to the constitution and laws of the United
States is received by all as the true construction . . . .”).
62. See Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts
Disagree on Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2014) (discussing
varied Fourth Amendment positions adopted by state appellate courts and federal circuit
courts within the same circuit based on concurrent federal constitutional interpretive authority); see also Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and
the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137 (2012) (discussing varied Fourth
Amendment positions adopted by different federal circuit courts of appeal).
63. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1994) (“Deciding what a
precedent means will frequently depend on the particular normative values and assumptions
each judge brings to the interpretive enterprise.”); see also Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts
Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2008) (noting instances where state courts strayed from
Court doctrine); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below
Federal Constitutional Limits, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 227 (2008) (noting instances where state
courts apply doctrine in a narrower fashion than the Court).
64. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 929, 953 (1965).

378

INDIA NA LA W J OUR NA L

[Vol. 93:369

the job of the several police agencies in the state.”65 Because of this, variations in
criminal codes affect the power of police to search and seize individuals.
In contrast to areas such as commercial law, which have become increasingly
homogeneous over time, 66 criminal law is marked by considerable diversity:
“crimes,” the Supreme Court observed in Rochin v. California, “are what the laws
of the individual States make them.”67 Variation exists not only in the particular
behaviors criminalized68 but also in the definitions of mutually proscribed
misconduct.69 States also vary in the punishments they prescribe, which can affect
the power of police to conduct warrantless entries of suspects’ homes70 and conduct
investigative stops.71
Importantly, moreover, localities within states enjoy significant criminal lawmaking authority.72 Operating pursuant to delegated home rule authority73 and subject to the only modest limits typically imposed by state preemption doctrine,74 local
governments enact distinct laws, or modify existing state laws, tailored to their
unique conditions and challenges.75 Adding to this diversity, urban localities in particular in recent years have enacted laws operative within particular “zones,” affording police increased enforcement wherewithal for misconduct such as prostitution
and drug-related offenses.76

65. Wayne R. LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of
the Police, 45 TEX. L. REV. 434, 436 (1967).
66. See Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 267 (2003)
(noting that state commercial law “has become close to a single, unified body of law”).
67. 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952).
68. See Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 259 (2005) (providing examples of distinctions).
69. See Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State
Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 76–77 (2006).
70. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (terming punishment the “best
indication” of constitutional reasonableness).
71. See, e.g., Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir.
2004) (allowing stop when reasonable suspicion exists of completed felony but not misdemeanor).
72. For fuller discussion of this phenomenon, see Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal
Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001).
73. See DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN HILL, HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A
FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 2 (2001) (“[T]he ideal of home rule is defined as the ability of a local
government to act and make policy in all areas that have not been designated to be of statewide
interest through general law, state constitutional provisions, or initiatives and referenda.”). On
the varied nature and extent of home rule authority exercised by local governments, see Paul
Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1125–27 (2007).
74. See generally Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. &
POL. 1, 17–27 (2006) (discussing limited state exercise of preemption authority).
75. See 1 SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.05[2], at
21–22 (2d ed. 2000) (“The reality is that state legislatures seldom legislate on all or general
concerns, and a social and political vacuum would exist if a home rule entity desired to impose
controls on those matters within its own borders and was not permitted to do so.”).
76. Robert L. Scharff, Note, An Analysis of Municipal Drug and Prostitution Exclusion
Zones, 15 GEO. MASON C.R.L.J. 321 (2005).
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Finally, localities contribute to variability by opting out of otherwise applicable
state criminal law. Perhaps the most notable recent example of this relates to possession of small amounts of marijuana. While several states have legalized or decriminalized possession,77 localities in states where possession remains a crime have either
decriminalized possession78 or directed local police to accord it a “lowest law enforcement priority.”79
In short, the substantive law authority of police to search and seize varies considerably not only between states, but among localities within states, resulting in corresponding variation in Fourth Amendment protections.
B. Geography
Another factor driving Fourth Amendment variability is place. To begin, not only
do the Amendment’s protections typically not apply outside the United States,80 but
they are limited at and near the nation’s borders.81 At the border, individuals are subject to routine detention without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,82 and the
“thumbs are on the scale” in assessing whether reasonable suspicion exists to seize
individuals near borders.83 As the Court noted in Arvizu v. United States,84 “[w]e
think it quite reasonable that a driver’s [behaviors] . . . might well be unremarkable
in one instance (such as a busy San Francisco highway) while quite unusual in another (such as a remote portion of rural southeastern Arizona).”85 By the same token,
individuals on boats, depending on location, can enjoy lessened Fourth Amendment
protection,86 as do individuals at domestic airports.87
Being associated with a particular state can also have an impact on one’s rights.
Anyone visiting Florida, for instance, should be aware that the Sunshine State is a
“drug source state,” which can affect police assessments of possible criminal activity.88 Similarly, a car with California license plates can raise justifiable suspicion

77. See Main: State Info, NORML http://norml.org/states [https://perma.cc/D85JWPFG].
78. See Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped: Decriminalization and Legalism’s
Limits, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 326 (2014).
79. Lowest Law Enforcement Priority Jurisdictions, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT,
https://www.mpp.org/lowest-law-enforcement-priority-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/74F9GLCA].
80. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990); see also
Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 364 (2015) (noting that
“territoriality is a critical factor in assessing both the reach of the Fourth Amendment and the
scope of the government’s authority to search and seize”).
81. See generally 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.5 (5th ed. 2015).
82. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
83. Id. at 558.
84. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
85. Id. at 275–76.
86. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 374 F. Supp. 2d 513, 521 (E.D. Ky. 2005).
88. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 (1983).
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when the car is in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in December.89 So too can traveling between particular cities.90
Where one is located in a particular community can also be important, especially
if the area is a “high crime area.”91 In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court made this clear
when it held that while running from police alone does not suffice as a basis for
police to stop an individual, flight in a high crime area does.92 As a consequence, as
one commentator recently observed, “the young man in the Bronx gets bent over a
patrol car while the young man in Upper Manhattan jogs home unmolested.”93
Policing, moreover, is known to concentrate on particular public spaces; a person
on a street corner is more likely to catch the eye of police than an individual inside a
building or within a gated community. Privacy, as William Stuntz noted, “is something that exists only in certain types of spaces; not surprisingly, the law protects it
only where it exists.”94 A person able to buy or rent a stand-alone house, with a yard
qualifying as physical curtilage, enjoys more privacy protection than someone residing in an apartment building with a common hallway.95 “[I]t is simple realism,” Judge
Posner wrote, “that people who live in rural areas or have wealth will have more
physical privacy than people who live in cities . . . and that therefore they will derive
more protection from the Fourth Amendment.”96
Finally, variation is baked into the Fourth Amendment by institutional and governmentally demarcated space. The Supreme Court has held, for instance, that public
school students have a lowered expectation of privacy when at school.97 Authorities
wishing to search them need only have “reasonable grounds” (not probable cause) to
believe they violated a law or school rule.98 Likewise, individuals entering special
enclaves such as military bases99 and tribal lands100 enjoy a lowered expectation of
privacy.

89. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
90. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989); see also Charles E. Cox, Jr.,
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 65 MERCER L. REV. 891, 899 n.76 (2014) (citing other
instances).
91. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 144 (1972).
92. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
93. Andrew Dammann, Note, Categorical and Vague Claims that Criminal Activity Is
Afoot: Solving the High-Crime Area Dilemma Through Legislative Action, 2 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 559, 561 (2015). The Supreme Court has yet to define the criteria used to define a “high
crime area,” which often hinges on whether “officers say it’s a high crime area.” United States
v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
94. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1266–67 (1999) (“It follows that people who have money have more Fourth
Amendment protection than people who don’t.”).
95. See id. at 1270.
96. United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1132 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., dissenting).
97. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995).
98. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985).
99. See, e.g., United States v. McCarthy, 38 M.J. 398, 401–03 (C.M.A. 1993) (upholding
right of military police to conduct warrantless searches on military bases).
100. See, e.g., Hopi Tribe v. Kahe, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6079, 6079–80 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1994)
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C. Resources
Variability in Fourth Amendment rights can also stem from basic local differences
in resources. Like other aspects of the criminal justice system,101 policing is highly
sensitized to resources and decisions regarding their allocation. More police on the
payroll correlates with more police deployed to search and seize, and department or
even precinct-level tactical deployment decisions affect when, how, and where police-citizen contact occurs.102
A department’s financial wherewithal to purchase technological tools can also
significantly affect the likelihood of being searched and seized.103 Today, over
ninety percent of police departments serving jurisdictions of 250,000 or more
residents employ “crime mapping” technology, allowing police to direct attention
and resources to particular areas, 104 yet only sixty percent of smaller jurisdiction
agencies do so. 105 Similar variation is evident with “predictive policing”
technologies, which employ computer software to analyze large data sets from
disparate sources to predict where criminal activity might occur.106 Finally, access
to technology can affect the duration of police seizures,107 as well as their
intrusiveness, given variations in department access to military-grade equipment
and readiness to deploy SWAT teams. 108

(stating that the probable cause standard for searches and seizures is to be based on considerations unique to the Hopi Tribe).
101. Funding for provision of counsel to indigent criminal defendants is one notable example. See Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local
Funding of Indigent Criminal Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219 (2010).
102. With the New York City Police Department’s “stop and frisk” policy, concentrated in
particular neighborhoods, being a prominent example. See Shannon Portillo & Danielle S.
Rudes, Construction of Justice at the Street Level, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 321 (2014).
103. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89
WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014).
104. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing
“High-Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 189 (2011).
105. Id.
106. DAVID ROBINSON & LOGAN KOEPKE, STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE ON
“PREDICTIVE POLICING” AND CIVIL RIGHTS 2 (2016). Predictably, dedicating more police attention and resources to an area can result in the self-fulfilling and perpetuating result of an
area being targeted on an ongoing basis. See BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION:
PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 147–50 (2007).
107. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1618 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(noting that “if a driver is stopped by an officer with access to technology that can shorten a
records check, then he will be entitled to be released from the stop after a shorter period of
time than an individual stopped by an officer without access to such technology”).
108. See Kara Dansky, Local Democratic Oversight of Police Militarization, 10 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 59 (2016); see also Bruce Smith, Prosecutor: Death of Man Shot by Police Was
‘Senseless,’ SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2015, 12:05 AM), http://www.sandiegounion
tribune.com/sdut-arguments-open-in-murder-trial-of-white-ex-police-2015jan07-story.html
(discussing local police officer’s decision to use lethal force, instead of a Taser, due to small
size and lack of resources of local department).
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In short, even though the Supreme Court presumes that the Fourth Amendment
applies uniformly across the land, 109 and refuses to consider that Fourth
Amendment rights should be allowed to “vary from place to place,”110 the empiric
reality is that Fourth Amendment rights do vary. Next, the discussion turns to the
work of scholars whose recommendations would add to this diversity in a new and
significant way.
II. THE LOCALISTS
Fourth Amendment doctrine has long been the target of harsh criticism. In 1971,
Justice Harlan, pointing to “serious distortions and incongruities,” urged that it be
“overhaul[ed].”111 Over time, multiple commentators have joined in the critique,112
condemning inter alia the Supreme Court’s reliance upon and faulty understanding
of Framing Era history,113 its efforts to define what qualifies as “unreasonable,”114
and understanding of the Amendment’s basic purpose.115 They have also lamented
what has been called the “incredible shrinking Fourth Amendment,”116 which too
often tilts in favor of police authority,117 and its frequent divorce from real-world

109. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
110. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
111. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490–91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
112. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth
Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 204 (1993) (calling doctrine “illogical, unprincipled, ad hoc, and theoretically incoherent”); Kerr, supra note 43, at 809 (“With so many decided cases and so few agreed-upon principles at work, trying to understand the Fourth
Amendment is a bit like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle with several incorrect pieces.”).
113. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should
Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2002); David A.
Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000).
114. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”:
The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 284 (2016) (“All the Supreme Court
has provided by way of guidance is a growing litany of vague and indeterminate phrases and
legal tests.”).
115. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
303 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503 (2007); Luke M. Milligan, The Forgotten Right To Be Secure, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 713
(2014).
116. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 257 (1984).
117. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16, at 1890 (“Although there are exceptions, for the most part today the Justices adopt a posture of extreme deference in policing
cases, one that is very difficult to explain as a matter of constitutional theory.”); Rachel A.
Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 817 (2012) (“Constitutional rights,
by their nature, take law enforcement interests into account ex ante and therefore are inevitably
drafted to provide generous minimum standards for law enforcement conduct.”).
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empirics.118 Worse yet, the Court has struggled, not altogether successfully, to craft
doctrine amid rapidly changing technologies expanding police authority.119
In response, scholars have advanced a variety of institutional options less dependent on judicial prerogative. This Part surveys two foremost efforts taking shape in
recent years, one urging reliance on the outcomes of direct democracy, exercised by
local political bodies, the other looking to laws and regulations adopted by local administrative rule-making authorities.
A. “New Democratists”
In the late 1990s, Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares authored a series of
provocative articles urging direct democratic control over the regulation of police.
Focusing in particular on urban areas, Kahan and Meares argued that poor and minority residents in such areas wielded greater political voice and influence than in
the past and that police forces and leadership were increasingly diversified, alleviating historic concern over enactment of laws permitting police overreach.120 They also
asserted that local democratic preferences warranted deference both because they
reflected local needs and conditions121 and because the risk of abusive policies being
adopted was lessened as their effects would be internalized by the community itself.122 Kahan and Meares reasoned that “insofar as [local] policies do burden average members of the community, there is much less reason for courts to doubt the
determination of politically accountable officials that these policies strike a fair balance between liberty and order.”123
Entitling their article The Coming Crisis in Criminal Procedure, Kahan and
Meares wrote that it was “now time to construct a new criminal procedure, one
uniquely fitted to the conditions that currently characterize American social and political life and that are likely to characterize it into the foreseeable future.”124 In this
new regime, judicial aversion for local democracy was no longer warranted.125 New
doctrine must “recognize the legitimate function of discretionary policing techniques

118. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227 (2015); Lee
Epstein, Barry Friedman & Geoffrey R. Stone, Foreword: Testing the Constitution, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1001, 1024 (2015); Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87
TEX. L. REV. 913, 915 (2009).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(stating that it “may be necessary to reconsider” the third party doctrine because the “approach
is ill suited to the digital age”).
120. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998).
121. Id. at 1161–65, 1177–80.
122. Id. at 1172–76; see also id. at 1168 (“Inner city supporters . . . do not seek to exclude
and cast out offenders; rather they seek policing methods that will assist them in the project of
restoring community life. Their support of the new policing is, in fact, an outgrowth of their
concern for their community’s youth, not of hostility toward them.” (emphasis in original)).
123. Id. at 1172–73 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 1153 (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 1155–59.
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in combatting inner-city crime, and also the competence of inner-city communities
to protect themselves from abusive police behavior.”126 Kahan and Meares urged
connect[ing] constitutional doctrine to the values and insights of the
communities in which such policing is taking place . . . . A doctrine that
listens to the answers of the citizens who have the most at stake would
be the beginning of both wisdom and legitimacy for a new regime of
criminal procedure.127
Later that same year, after the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated an anti-gang
loitering ordinance enacted by the Chicago City Council,128 Professors Meares and
Kahan published a follow-up article condemning the court’s decision as a relic of
“antiquated procedural thinking.”129 They traced the political history of the ordinance, distinguishing it from instances in the past when, in the South especially, “institutionalized racism fully justified the Court’s suspicion of democratic politics.”130
Meares and Kahan advocated a new constitutional calculus, one requiring judicial
deference when the effect of a local law is felt by local denizens themselves: “Instead
of viewing all law-enforcement techniques with suspicion, courts should ask whether
the community has internalized the burden that a particular law imposes on individual freedom. If it has, the court should presume that the law does not violate individual rights.”131
Their arguments did not go unchallenged. Professors Albert Alschuler and
Stephen Schulhofer disputed the history of the Chicago ordinance provided by
Meares and Kahan, asserting that it was in fact controversial and contested by various
community groups.132 They also warned of the “appealing but highly manipulable
rhetoric of ‘community,’” with its “attractions of a sense of place, shared values, and
neighborhood empowerment.”133 “Which community counts,” they asked, “the minority community or the residents of the highest crime wards? And what procedures
should be used to sort through the conflicting preferences held by members of either
one of these groups?”134 Even more fundamentally, Alschuler and Schulhofer argued, “[o]ur Constitution does not permit a majority to limit individual rights simply
by offering to share the burden.”135 The Framers “enacted a Constitution that guaranteed rights, not to collectivities, but to individuals.”136

126. Id. at 1154.
127. Id. at 1184.
128. City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59 (Ill. 1997), aff’d, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
129. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking:
A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197.
130. Id. at 205.
131. Id. at 209.
132. Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 217–20.
133. Id. at 216.
134. Id. at 241; see also id. at 242 (“The concept of community . . . provides almost limitless opportunities for creative redefinition and manipulation.”).
135. Id. at 240.
136. Id. at 244; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social
Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 834 (1999)
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Professor David Cole similarly disputed the premise that the changing composition of urban police departments diminished the threat of police overreach.137 This
was because “someone will always be the loser [in police enforcement], and [] the
losers will generally be those without effective political power.”138 Cole also dismissed the view that the potential for abuse was mitigated because communities
shared a “linked fate,” inasmuch as the “average citizen” would not be the typical
target of police.139 Finally, he reasoned, that deference “to ‘the community’ means
simply to favor the majority’s interests over the minority’s within that community,
hardly a principled way to resolve a constitutional dispute.”140
Professor Alafair Burke, drawing on her experience as a “neighborhood prosecutor” in Portland, Oregon, questioned whether equal access and participation can be
ensured, noting that even the appearance of consensus was often illusory.141 This is
because “every community, however defined, has its outsiders ‘whose complaints
are least likely to be heard by the rest of the community.’”142 Burke noted how she
would “massag[e] public perception of the community,”143 adding that policies
adopted themselves might not truly reflect community preference, but rather
may very well be viewed by the community as the lesser of policy evils
in a world where politically feasible alternatives are limited by the
broader majority. . . . [I]nner-city communities do not—even with the
increased political power that Kahan and Meares attribute to them—have
the ability to shape the governance of their communities as they might
truly see fit.144

(“The Constitution places limits on the government’s ability to conduct social experiments
that sacrifice minority freedoms to enhance the welfare of the majority.”).
137. David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to
the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1081–82 (1999).
138. Id. at 1082.
139. Id. at 1068 (citing Kahan & Meares, supra note 10, at 1165, 1175–76).
140. Id. at 1087.
141. Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former Neighborhood
District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1005 (2003).
142. Id. (quoting Cole, supra note 137, at 1083).
143. Id. at 1007; see also id. (citing the example of “Richard,” an African-American retiree
who would attend community meetings and “could be counted on to vocalize a predictably
pro-police stance at critical city council meetings and other decisionmaking sessions.
Preparing for such meetings always involved a phone call to Richard to ensure his participation”).
144. Id. at 1009 (emphasis in original). Other scholars have since echoed Burke’s concern
over the democratic processes and inclusiveness of locally generated criminal justice policy.
See, e.g., LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF
CRIME CONTROL 177 (2008) (noting, based on field observations, that “local crime politics is
a mess of self-interested, frustrated groups . . . . They seem to know little about policy solutions
they want and even less about how to get them.”); Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community
Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 380 (2005) (noting that local processes “rely on
groups of volunteers that are not representative of the community and . . . are prone to being
dominated by a vocal and active minority”).
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Despite the foregoing criticisms, democratic localism in criminal justice policy
has its proponents. In two recent books, Professors William Stuntz145 and Stephanos
Bibas146 urged that local government actors and citizens play a more prominent policy-making role.147 Professor Andrew Taslitz, in turn, has argued that “Fourth
Amendment law should vary based on geographic concerns,” because otherwise
there comes risk of “silenc[ing] the political voice of poor urban racial minorities”
who enjoy most political influence within the local (not state or federal) legislative
arenas.148
B. “New Administrativists”
Charting an alternate course, several scholars have urged that courts defer to rules
regulating police when the rules result from local executive and quasi-executive entities. In Democratic Policing,149 Professor Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko
mounted arguably the broadest argument in this vein, focusing on “enforcement
methods,” such as use of drones, car license plate readers, and other bulk data surveillance tools, or “Stingrays”; police resort to Tasers and pepper spray; use of drunkdriving checkpoints; and knock-and-announce.150
Friedman and Ponomarenko assert that “[i]t is both unacceptable and unwise for
[law enforcement agencies] to remain aloof from the democratic processes that apply
to the rest of agency government . . . policing policies and practices should be governed through transparent democratic processes such as legislative authorization and
public rulemaking.”151 Doing so is necessary not only because of the judiciary’s fail-

145. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
146. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012).
147. See, e.g., id. at 146–47 (urging “[c]ollaborative, open decision-making, in consultation
with local residents” in a variety of policy areas, which would promote community buy-in and
temper police overreach, citing Meares and Kahan in support); STUNTZ, supra note 145, at 283
(“Local neighborhoods should exercise more power . . . as they once did.”); see also Richard A.
Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of Punishment, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (2017) (“In reviewing local laws, policies, and police and prosecutorial
actions, judges might consider the degree to which they reflect community or neighborhood
preferences based on inclusive, responsive, and autonomous processes, deferring more to those
that do.”).
148. Taslitz, supra note 11, at 279–80. Building upon this faith, one student commentator
recently urged that city councils designate particular spaces as “high crime areas” per Wardlow.
Dammann, supra note 93, at 574 (“[A]s a democratically elected body, city councils’ high-crime
designations would carry the weight of the political process and would thus be more deserving
of judicial deference.”); id. at 577 (“[T]he democratically elected representatives of those citizens
should have a voice in deciding whether their Fourth Amendment rights will be diminished.”).
149. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16.
150. Id. at 1848, 1851, 1878, 1883.
151. Id. at 1832. While they mainly focus on administrative agency-like processes, the authors maintain that democratic authorization, however obtained, is what is important. See id.
at 1834 (“Such authorization can come through specific legislation. It can be the product of
administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking, in which public participation is welcomed.
Or . . . new means of soliciting democratic engagement may be required.”).
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ure to effectively regulate police; it is because “judicial review . . . can never substitute for popular control. The regulation of police involves profound policy questions
that must be resolved in democratically accountable ways.”152 Moreover, “opening
rulemaking to local community participation will bring voices into the process that
may have had no outlet thus far. . . . [T]hose who live in heavily-policed communities
have strong views about police practices. . . . What they lack is a formal mechanism
through which to make their voices heard.”153
The authors acknowledge that local policy outcomes will not always favor civil
liberties. However, they reason that “[i]f existing rules are too deferential to the interests of police . . . it is hard to see that they will necessarily get worse. The hope is
that with public participation, controversial practices will be moved in a better direction.”154 When addressing the constitutionality of a regulation, courts should “focus
on identifying [political] process failures, should refuse to defer to policing actions
that lack a sufficient democratic pedigree, and offer safe harbors for those that are
authorized through democratic means.”155
More recently, Professor Christopher Slobogin has urged judicial deference to local administrative rules in the narrower context of programmatic searches and seizures, such as auto roadblocks, drug-testing programs, DNA sampling, and mass data
collection (which he collectively refers to as “panvasive”).156 In Policing as
Administration, Slobogin asserts that the litmus test for assessing the constitutionality of a regulation should be whether the requisites of the administrative law-making
process are satisfied.157 Like Friedman and Ponomarenko, Slobogin identifies a number of crucial instrumental benefits accruing:
[Applying administrative law] principles would improve democratic accountability and counter the usual law enforcement orientation of legislative bodies by requiring public input prior to implementation, agency
rationalization of the program, implementation that is both consistent
with the stated rationale and that is evenhandedly carried out, and legislative authorization that is sufficiently specific to satisfy a court that a
representative body considers the program permissible.158
A court faced with a challenge to a policy regulation would apply a “hard look”
standard of review, first asking whether the local rule making is legislatively

152. Id. at 1836.
153. Id. at 1879–80.
154. Id. at 1879.
155. Id. at 1836.
156. Christopher Slobogin, supra note 15, at 93; id. at 96 (“Because . . . panvasive searches
and seizures are policy-driven, group-based, and suspicionless, they are legislative in nature.
They are carried out in aid of a generally applicable regime that, if promulgated by any other
agency, would be considered a form of rule governed by administrative law principles.”).
157. Id. at 95 (“[C]onstitutional law should largely be beside the point. . . . Instead, the
concrete rules governing panvasive techniques should be viewed through the entirely different
prism of administrative law.”).
158. Id. at 149; see also id. at 152 (asserting that the foregoing requirements, “enforced by
the courts, would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s central goal—embodied in its
reasonableness requirement”).
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authorized159 and then assessing “whether the police department has followed a
rational procedure that produced a rational policy consistent with legislative
directives and whether the policy is implemented in an evenhanded manner.” 160
Professor Erik Luna in an earlier article also urged an administrative path, advocating adoption of “enforcement principles” to guide discretionary decisions of police regarding enforcement low-level offenses.161 Luna outlined a process whereby
police leaders and various public officials identify “troublesome areas of selective
enforcement,” and generate principles to guide enforcement of such offenses, which
would “be publicized and feedback would be solicited from community members in
an open forum or town meeting.”162 “Based on community input and political debate,
law enforcement would formally and publicly adopt those principles that withstood
scrutiny and would instruct frontline officers on the import and application of the
principles.”163 With greater transparency and citizen participation, Luna reasoned,
would come increased community respect for legal commands and for the police that
enforce them.164
More recently, Professor John Rappaport urged “[s]hifting rulemaking responsibility from the Court to political actors” to “writ[e] conduct rules to govern streetlevel officers.”165 Doing so will allow community buy-in, experimentation, and the
tailoring of police regulations to “local needs and resources.”166 Andrew Selbst, focusing in particular on use of predictive policing methods involving “big data,” advocated judicial reliance on the expertise of local departments in the development of
algorithms informed by public input.167

159. Such legislation, for instance, regarding auto checkpoints or license plate recognition
systems, would specify the “‘persons or activities’” to be regulated, and the “‘harm’” to be
prevented. Id. at 148.
160. Id. at 121; see also id. at 135 (“[T]he most pertinent aspects of [administrative] law
for panvasive police conduct are the notice-and-comment requirement, the requirement that
rules be adequately explained in writing, the requirement that rules be implemented evenhandedly, and the requirement that rules not exceed the relevant legislative authorization.”).
Professor Slobogin notes that local governments are not typically subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), but asserts that “they are not necessarily
immune from the dictates of administrative procedure.” Id. at 121 n.153; see also id. at 135
(arguing that local departments should be subject to the APA when “carrying out panvasive
actions in service of state or federal criminal law”).
161. Luna, supra note 17.
162. Id. at 603.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 527; see also Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1167
(2000) (“By expounding guidelines in an open forum, subject to public commentary and debate, law enforcement . . . empowers the citizenry through sharing information and collaborating on appropriate policing principles.”).
165. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 212, 232.
166. Id. at 236.
167. Selbst, supra note 17, at 182.
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C. Summary
Taken together, the foregoing scholarly camps, while each advocating a shift
away from judge-centric decision making, chart distinct paths. The New
Democratists urge judicial deference to local democratic preferences regarding both
discretionary (“suspicion-based”) policing targeting individuals and programmatic
(i.e., “suspicionless”) searches focusing on the public as a whole,168 despite the significant political process difficulties noted earlier.169
New Administrativists, for their part, urge deference to rules and regulations generated by local government administrative units, yet at times (Professor Slobogin in
particular) limit their focus to programmatic policing. Friedman and Ponomarenko
maintain that courts should defer when “police decisions about enforcement methods
. . . represent considered, fact-based judgment formulated with democratic input.”170
They should “only refuse to accord deference to policing rules that lack a democratic
pedigree”171 and are not the “product of sound democratic processes.”172 They emphasize that no deference should be accorded when there exists “constitutional
doubt” about a policy, yet fail to specify when such scrutiny should be triggered.
They also fail to specify what precisely qualifies as a “democratic pedigree” or when
“sound democratic processes” are in evidence.173
For Professor Slobogin, so long as administrative rule-making prerequisites are
satisfied, “constitutional law should largely be beside the point . . . functioning
only as a backstop protection for fundamental liberties and as an exhortation that
panvasive actions be reasonable.” 174 Again, it remains unclear when a court’s constitutional oversight role would be triggered but it is evident that local government
compliance with administrative law expectations neutralizes cause for searching
judicial scrutiny. 175 Nor are the procedural trappings of such a regime spelled out

168. See infra notes 120–131 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 132–148 and accompanying text.
170. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16, at 1892.
171. Id. at 1901.
172. Id. at 1898.
173. On the tendency of voters to lack knowledge regarding the policy positions taken by
their local candidates and officials more generally, see David Schleicher, Why Is There No
Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL.
419 (2007).
174. Slobogin, supra note 15, at 95.
175. See id. (stating that the “concrete rules governing panvasive techniques should be
viewed through the entirely different prism of administrative law”); id. at 134 (“[A] rule that
has cleared the relevant administrative law hurdles might [be] provide[d] a constitutional safe
harbor.”); id. at 151 (asserting that “[a] regulatory regime based on administrative law principles would . . . avoid subjecting departmental decisions to detailed second-guessing by the
judiciary.”). Professor Rappaport similarly writes that while courts “must promise (and deliver) meaningful deference to policy makers’ solutions,” they need not defer when “politically
created safeguards fail to sufficiently protect the Constitution’s values,” yet fails to elaborate
on this critically line of demarcation. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 256, 262. More recently,
Andrew Selbst, addressing local police agency adoption of predictive policing procedures,
acknowledges the appeal of judicial review but objects to “shift[ing] responsibility . . . from a
combination of policing agencies and public comment to the courts.” Selbst, supra note 17, at

390

INDIA NA LA W J OUR NA L

[Vol. 93:369

with specificity, a matter of considerable importance given the undeveloped and
uneven state of local administrative law more generally. 176 Local administrative
units, moreover, vary enormously in their quality and expertise 177 and political
accountability. 178
Finally, New Administrativists, as Professor Slobogin acknowledges, also tend to
overlook significant political process problems that can mire criminal justice policy
making. 179 Like the New Democratists they also fail to pay due regard to the important variations in the structures and working dynamics of local governments
and officials, 180 which can have critical importance in the ways in which law and
policy is formulated. 181 Nor should it be overlooked that voter engagement in local
election contests is even less than in state and national elections. 182 Low turnout
undercuts the localist presumption of superior political accountability and
participatory democracy, 183 as well as the likelihood of minority political leaders
being elected.184
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the efforts of scholars in both camps to
increase governmental transparency and accountability are to be commended.185

182.
176. See Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 572 (2017)
(noting that “the precise procedural requirements binding local agencies are often surprisingly
murky”). Of note, the distinctiveness of local governments precludes their administrative law
from being a simple body-double of the federal government’s. Id. at 574–576; see also id. at
614 n.227 (noting “the risk of too quickly equating the familiar institutional structures of federal administrative agencies with a local government structure that can vary significantly.”).
177. See id. at 30, 41–43, 55.
178. See id. at 49–50; see also id. at 63–64 (noting that local agencies vary in their relation
to political leaders and that it therefore “may be difficult to hold mayors and city council
members and other local elected officials directly accountable for administrative actions”).
179. Slobogin, supra note 15, at 119 (noting that “the new administrativists are unduly
sanguine about the ability of legislatures and their delegates to avoid catering to law enforcement interests”).
180. In this respect they share a fault of local government law scholars more generally. See
David Schleicher, Local Government Law’s “Law and __” Problem, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1951, 1954 (2013) (noting inter alia that “there has been too little focus on studying the incentives of local officials or strategic interaction between such officials inside existing governmental structures”).
181. See, e.g., Noah M. Kazis, American Unicameralism: The Structure of Local Legislatures, 69 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (highlighting the ways in which the unicameral
local governing arrangement, in place virtually nationwide, can lack democratic participation
and internal checks and balances).
182. Curtis Wood, Voter Turnout in City Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 209, 223 (2002)
(estimating that voter turnout in large urban elections is less than thirty-four percent).
183. See supra notes 120–131, 151–173 and accompanying text.
184. Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of
Uneven Turnout in City Politics, 67 J. POL. 515, 524 (2005).
185. See EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN POLICE
AGENCIES 31, 76, 90, 99 (2003) (discussing opacity in development of police departmental
policies). As Rachel Harmon has noted, this lack of accountability is exacerbated by the massive amount of funding that local police secure from the federal government. Harmon, supra
note 2.
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So too are their goals of increasing citizen input on policing policy, which has long
been lacking, 186 and urging greater regulation of police practices more generally.187
Arguably, these functional benefits alone warrant the unconditional embrace of
localism. As discussed next, however, even assuming that local processes operate
as advocates hope, according constitutional deference to local policy preferences
is problematic for a variety of reasons.
III. ASSESSING LOCALISM’S LIMITS
Allocating constitutional norm-making authority to local political units shares
an obvious parallel to federalism, which “assures a decentralized government that
will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society.”188
Federalism, which of course pertains to states, 189 ideally “increases opportunity for
citizen involvement in democratic processes; [] allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and [] makes government more responsive by
putting States in competition for a mobile citizenry.” 190 Localism, as Professor
Richard Briffault has observed, not only serves these goals, 191 it actually enhances
the prospect of them being satisfied.192 As Dean Daniel Rodriguez put it, localism
is “the intrastate analogue of federalism in American constitutional law.” 193 This
Part assesses the extent to which the instrumental goals of localism, whatever their
effect in other contexts, play out in the Fourth Amendment context.
A. Tailoring
A foremost benefit of localism is its capacity to permit policy and practice to
reflect local needs and norms. As Justice Black wrote almost a half century ago:

186. Luna, supra note 17, at 587–90 (noting that in poor, inner city communities many lack
political voice at ballot box and that notice and comment might mitigate this problem).
187. Thanks to Professor Christopher Slobogin for highlighting this benefit.
188. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
189. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272 (2000) (noting an “established practice of
permitting the States, within the broad bounds of the Constitution, to experiment with solutions to difficult questions of policy”).
190. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; see also id. (stating that federalism “assures a decentralized
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society”).
191. See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns
in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1315 (1994) (“These virtues of federalism—participation, diversity, intergovernmental competition, political responsiveness,
and innovation—are, of course, among the very values regularly associated with local autonomy.”).
192. Id. at 1316 (“If grass-roots participation, intergovernmental competition, political
responsiveness, subnational diversity, and innovation are promoted by the relatively small
number of relatively large states, then these values out to be far more effectively advanced
by the empowerment of the far larger number of much smaller local governments.”).
193. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 627 (2001).
For an extended discussion of the parallel, see Rick Su, Intrastate Federalism, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 191 (2016).
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It is always time to say that this Nation is too large, too complex and
composed of too great a diversity of peoples for any one of us to have
the wisdom to establish the rules by which local Americans must
govern their local affairs . . . . [Courts should observe the] ancient faith
based on the premise that experience in making local laws by local
people themselves is by far the safest guide for a nation like ours to
follow. 194
With the Fourth Amendment, such pluralism arguably has even more appeal
because, as Professor Andrew Taslitz put it, “[t]he [Supreme] Court has defined
reasonableness as a balancing of state against individual interests, and it seems
logical that those interests can vary geographically.” 195
But tying federal constitutional norms to local political preferences carries risks.
While local governments over time have evinced progressive views, for instance
recognizing gay rights and enacting antidiscrimination ordinances, 196 and
tempering enforcement of and penalties associated with possessing small amounts
of marijuana,197 one need not look far for examples of heavy-handedness. Indeed,
not long ago localities aggressively targeted gays for criminal law enforcement198
and made no pretense of fair treatment of subpopulations such as African199 and
Chinese-Americans.200 More recently, localities have resorted to an array of

194. Powell v. Texas, 393 U.S. 514, 547–48 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); see also City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 114–15 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he people who
will have to live with the consequences of today’s opinion do not live in our neighborhoods.
Rather, the people who will suffer from our lofty pronouncements are people like Mrs. Susan
Mary Jackson; people who have seen their neighborhoods literally destroyed by gangs and
violence and drugs.”); id. at 100 (attaching importance to fact that challenged ordinance resulted from a “democratic process” that included “extensive hearings” where “[o]rdinary citizens” spoke of neighborhood problems).
195. Taslitz, supra note 11, at 302; see also Barron, supra note 25, at 595–96 (“[E]xpress
recognition of local constitutionalism may engage local communities more directly in the public practice of constitutional interpretation and accord constitutional recognition to the diverse
conceptions of constitutionalism that local communities embrace.”).
196. Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. REV. 955
(2012); Michèle Finck, The Role of Localism in Constitutional Change: A Case Study, 30 J.
L. & POL. 53 (2014).
197. Logan, supra note 78, at 325–27.
198. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1038–45 (1997).
199. See, e.g., Comm’rs of Washington v. Frank, 46 N.C. 436, 437 (1854) (upholding local
law for disorderly conduct that imposed a fine on white violators and “thirty-nine lashes” for
blacks). In backing the law, the North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized the importance of
localization, stating:
Different regulations are required in different localities . . . . Slaves compose so
large a portion of the population of our towns and villages that, in passing rules
and regulations for their government, much must be left to the judgment and discretion of those who are to enforce them, in their application to particular cases.
Id. at 440–41.
200. WILLIAM J. COURTNEY, SAN FRANCISCO’S ANTI-CHINESE ORDINANCES, 1850–1950 (1956).
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“loitering with intent” laws, 201 along with aggressive, proactive policing strategies
such as “zero tolerance.”202 Homeless individuals, 203 immigrants,204 and convicted
sex offenders205 have also been singled out, and recent revelations of police
overreach in New York, Baltimore, and Ferguson attest to local propensity for
excess.206
Localities have also unabashedly used the criminal justice system to extract fees
and surcharges from criminal offenders, especially poor and minority community
members suspected of engaging in low-level offenses.207 Similar zeal is evidenced in
local efforts to secure DNA samples from individuals, independent of state or federal
regulatory oversight.208
The foregoing examples are not provided to make the categorical case for local
oppressiveness; rather, they highlight Madison’s well-justified concern over local
factionalism,209 what Professor Timothy Zick has called the “geography of purification.”210 At the same time, local law enforcement officials, whose job it is to maintain

201. Logan, supra note 72, at 1450.
202. Susan A. Bandes, The Challenges of “Quality of Life” Policing for the Fourth
Amendment, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 45
(John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 2013).
203. Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official
Efforts To Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631 (1992).
204. Lindsay Nash, Expression by Ordinance: Preemption and Proxy in Local Legislation,
25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 243 (2011); Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation,
47 HOUS. L. REV. 367 (2010).
205. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion
Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5–13 (2006).
206. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. Nor, it should be noted, are such variations limited to localities within different states. See, e.g., Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher
Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 609 (2014)
(categorizing U.S. cities on a political spectrum and ranking San Francisco the least conservative
in its policy preferences and ranking Anaheim among the nation’s ten most conservative cities).
207. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1175, 1185–96 (2014).
208. Jason Kreag, Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. REV.
1491 (2015). Local governments, freed of the actual fiscal cost of imprisoning individuals
(typically absorbed by states), have also been prime drivers of the nation’s decades-long cycle of
mass imprisonment. See W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (On the State’s Dime): How Violent
Crime Does Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why It Should, 28 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 987, 992–93 (2012).
209. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also BRIAN E. DOLLERY & JOE L.
WALLIS, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 12–13, 39–70 (2001) (surveying
forms of political process failure among local governments); cf. City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522–23 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the “social reality .
. . that racial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the state and
local level than at the federal level”); Jamison E. Colburn, Localism’s Ecology: Protecting
and Restoring Habitat in the Suburban Nation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 945, 953 (2006) (asserting
that “localism is more typically factional, opaque, and self-dealing in nature.”).
210. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 576 (2009);
see also id. at 607 (“Territoriality is being used by governments to punish, control, restrict,
segregate, brand, demonize, and de-legalize certain persons and groups.”).

394

INDIA NA LA W J OUR NA L

[Vol. 93:369

public safety and are rewarded for doing so, are not naturally predisposed to vigilance
when it comes to civil liberties.211
In short, history teaches that the very proximity of local decision makers to perceived social ills is at least as likely to inspire harshness as the tempered response
optimistically hoped for by Meares and Kahan and others.212 Practicing federalism
“all the way down,” as Professor Gerken acknowledges, is thus a “two-edged
sword,”213 giving effect to repressive and progressive policies alike. This can be so
even when, as a formal matter, local democratic or administrative processes function
properly and boast the proper “pedigree.”214
Therein lies the rub of equating political responsiveness, transparency, and accountability with constitutional propriety.215 Substituting majoritarian preference for
constitutional analysis, as the New Democratists would have it, is not only contrary
to the antimajoritarian purpose of the Fourth Amendment.216 It would permit “the
political branches to govern without legal constraint,”217 creating what might be
called a “majoritarian difficulty.” As Professor John Ely observed, “it makes no sense
to employ the value judgements of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority.”218 And simply because a local populace might be inured to the negative consequences of a policy or practice,219 the

211. See Harmon, supra note 117, at 811 (“[Police] chiefs are usually better rewarded for
maintaining order and reducing crime than for protecting civil rights.”).
212. See supra notes 120–131, 145–148 and accompanying text.
213. Gerken, supra note 44, at 47; see also id. (“Federalism reimagined thus reveals that
the benefits of minority control can extend not just to Southern racists, but to blacks and
Latinos . . . .”).
214. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16, at 1837.
215. Cf. David H. Bayley, Community Policing: A Report from the Devil’s Advocate, in
COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 225, 237 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D.
Mastrofski eds., 1988) (“Local accountability does not substitute for professional, independent
oversight. Quite the contrary, it makes it more necessary. Americans especially have been
naïve about this, believing that rectitude was assured by local control. Responsiveness may be
achieved in this way, but not propriety under law.”).
216. See Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 330 (2016)
(“[T]he United States is made up of heterogeneous groups, some of which are more powerful
than others. In that context, the Fourth Amendment should be a bulwark for unpopular persons
and minority groups—a source of countermajoritarian rights.”). But see George C. Thomas,
III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth
Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 147, 158 (1993) (disputing “anti-majoritarian” view of Fourth
Amendment).
217. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008); see also Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588,
1601–02 (2010) (noting that reliance upon public surveys and positive law “does smack of
putting search and seizure law up for a vote, which runs against the constitutional grain”).
218. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 69
(1980); see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977)
(noting that liberty is threatened not so much by arbitrary acts of government, at odds with
those governed, as “acts in which the government is the mere instrument of the major number
of the constituents”).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
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courts need not be.220 Finally, cutting courts out of the equation raises obvious concern when a local law or policy impacts persons outside the locality who lack political voice in formation of the policy.221
The New Administrativists’ reliance on satisfaction of administrative rule making
presents similar difficulty. Simply checking the boxes of administrative process regularity, itself difficult to assess,222 risks substituting what might be mere regulatory
window dressing223 for substantive constitutional analysis by a court.224 An example
of the practical effect of such deference is seen with programmatic searches and seizures. Doctrine governing them is already thought unduly skewed in favor of government,225 turning on whether the “primary purpose” of a challenged strategy is
crime control or administrative in nature.226 Little reason exists to think that jurisdictions will resist characterizing a particular search or seizure as the latter, to redeem a

(“And even if the pubic does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology
entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”); see also
Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1311
(2012) (noting the public’s unwitting acceptance of a “surveillance society”).
220. See People v. Hauseman, 900 P.2d 74, 78 (Colo. 1995) (stating that “strict adherence
to standard police department procedures . . . does not necessarily satisfy the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard”).
221. See infra notes 330–331 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63
UCLA L. REV. 1300, 1333–52 (2016) (discussing reliance on questionably representative
groups when assessing public participation in rule making).
223. In defending his model, Professor Slobogin, for instance, evinces less than total confidence that notice-and-comment citizen input will actually occur. Slobogin, supra note 15, at
139 (noting that the process will afford “at least a patina of democratic participation”); id. at
139 n.257 (stating that “some participation is better than none”). Friedman and Ponomarenko,
in the conclusion of their article, modestly offer that “[e]ven small steps in the direction of
democratic accountability would go a long way toward a saner system of regulating the police.” Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16, at 1907.
224. Andrew Crespo has described the regime envisioned by New Administravists as one:
in which constitutionally grounded judicial review is largely replaced by an administrative framework built around law enforcement self-regulation. Rather
than judging the lawfulness of law enforcement actions directly, courts . . . would
instead judge the processes by which law enforcement actors judge themselves,
ensuring that those processes adhere to basic norms of transparency and democratic accountability, but otherwise deferring to law enforcement actors when it
comes to the substantive validity of the decisions, policies, and actions that those
actors pursue.
Crespo, supra note 13, at 2051. In this respect, proponents align with advocates of “administrative constitutionalism,” entailing a greater agency role in the interpretation and implementation of constitutional norms. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism,
91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013).
225. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 254, 296–97 (2011) (asserting that the Court’s balancing is “conducted in a way that
systematically favors the government”).
226. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (requiring courts to distinguish searches and seizures that have as their “primary purpose . . . [the] detect[ion] . . . of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing” from those that do not).
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search, when a reviewing court must simply sign off on whether administrative rulemaking requirements were satisfied.227
More problematic still, local governments, mindful of the undemanding judicial
scrutiny entailed in “hard look” review,228 a deferential standard that might or might
not be apt to accord a particular local agency,229 could be emboldened to pursue policies that they otherwise would not if subject to traditional judicial constitutional
scrutiny. As Professor Orin Kerr recently observed in arguing against use of privacy
legislation as a substitute for judicial analysis:
If courts look to legislation to interpret the Fourth Amendment, . . . legislation will take on constitutional importance. The prospect that courts
will interpret the Constitution differently ex post will tend to influence
the legislation that the elected branches enact ex ante. The resulting feedback loop provides a significant argument for independence.230
Professor Richard Re makes a similar point in critiquing an argument advanced
in support of the view that state and local positive law (e.g., trespass) should govern
whether police engage in a search. Re notes that doing so would make doctrine “contingent and jurisdictionally variable”231 and would “create an incentive for lawmakers to adjust privacy protections for private parties so as to expand the power of law
enforcement.”232 As Re observes, “when democratic pathologies arise, the positive
law model would have perverse effects, causing defects in regular lawmaking to curb
the Fourth Amendment.”233
Ultimately, moreover, the resulting feedback loop stands little chance of being
tempered by the states where localities are situated.234 State legislatures, as Nestor
Davidson has observed, “are particularly sensitive to local political communities, and
because states in the first instance create and empower localities, states may be bound

227. See, e.g., Pieter S. de Ganon, Note, Noticing Crisis, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 573, 596–98
(2011) (discussing the Court’s failure to critically examine government representations that a
problem against which search is directed, for example, a drug “crisis” warranting suspicionless
school drug testing, is supported by factual record).
228. Aaron Saiger, Local Government as a Choice of Agency Form, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 423,
447 (2016) (noting that “‘hard look’ review at its most demanding remains an inquiry only
into reasonableness, not desirability or wisdom”); see also Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule,
Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1356–57 (2016).
229. See Davidson, supra note 176, at 623 (“Legislative standards that might be acceptable
when given to a deeply resourced, professionally staffed traditional agency may become more
troubling when community members are tasked with the decision making.”).
230. Kerr, supra note 42, at 1158 (emphasis added).
231. Re, supra note 216, at 321.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 329.
234. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 112 (1990) (“State legislatures and state and federal courts have
proven unwilling to limit local power or alter the structure of state-local relations, even after
the effects of local autonomy in promoting interlocal inequality and local parochialism have
been demonstrated.”).
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too easily by the shortcomings of their own creations.”235 Legislative reluctance is
especially likely in light of the fact that local governments pay for policing,236 a matter squarely within their police power authority.237 Finally, given the likely absence
of political pressure by business interests, one should not expect to see states rush to
preempt local policing policy, as seen with rent control or smoking bans,238 or efforts
to limit fracking.239 Likewise, because policing policy typically lacks high political
salience, we should not expect to see state-level governmental intervention, as has
occurred with a hot button issue such as firearms possession.240
Nor is pushback likely to come from state and local judges,241 who are often subject to election242 and perhaps inclined to local fealty.243 As noted earlier, courts make
little use of preemption and conflict doctrine to limit local government authority to
enact low-level criminal laws,244 and their appetite for intervention is even less likely

235. Nestor Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of
State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1019 (2007).
236. JEFFREY L. BARNETT & PHILLIP M. VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCES: 2011, at 7 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/g11alfin.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5EA-VV68] (noting that nationwide local governments spent
$83.5 billion on police services in 2011, ranking just education as the greatest budgetary focus); id. at 4 (noting that local governments spend almost seven times as much on policing as
do states).
237. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (recognizing the broad
power of municipalities in the protection of public health and safety). Although remote, the
prospect of state intervention regarding local control over public safety policy is not beyond
the realm of possibility. See, e.g., Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 267 N.W. 25, 32 (Wis. 1936)
(noting historic local police power authority but stating that “it would be within the competency of the Legislature if it so desired to entirely rearrange the law of the state with respect
to these matters”); see also KRANE ET AL., supra note 73, at 1 (“Where the line between an
appropriate sphere of local action and the authority of state government is drawn has been a
source of continuous conflict in state capitals.”).
238. See Diller, supra note 73, at 1139 (recounting recent instances by state legislatures in
these areas).
239. See Courtney Walmer, Note, Governing Hydraulic Fracturing Through State-Local
Dynamic Federalism: Lessons from a Florida Case Study, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 867, 869–
70 (2015) (discussing state preemption legislation).
240. See Blocher, supra note 33, at 133 (discussing widespread state laws preempting local
limits on gun possession).
241. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial
Scrutiny, 86 DENVER U. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (2009) (“[S]tate courts have long affirmed the
police powers of home rule local governments to promote health, safety, and welfare . . . .”).
242. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How To Read a Statute in a
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 489 (2012) (noting that approximately ninety percent
of state and local judges face election of some kind).
243. Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 902, 907
(2013) (noting that state judges often align with the local rather than state interests).
244. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
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regarding local efforts to regulate their police forces.245 Nor will federal courts exercise oversight; habeas corpus is unavailable in the Fourth Amendment context246 and
direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely given its increasingly paltry
docket.247
Finally, it should not escape attention that local policing policy, as with local policy making more generally,248 can be heavily influenced by profit-motivated private
industry. For instance, it is now commonplace for private data companies to help in
the collection, storage, and analysis of data,249 and police departments rush to secure
the latest surveillance technology created and marketed by private vendors.250
Another example is found in ongoing efforts by local departments to develop
DNA databases, with firms eager to capitalize on business opportunities characterized by one vendor as “enormous.”251 When local databases operate independently
of state and federal guidelines, police enjoy much freer rein to secure samples,252
operating under a “more is better” mentality that benefits both law enforcement
(touting potential crime control advantages) and the businesses (profits as a result of
expansion).253
In this environment, pressure is predictably mounting to expand the scope of individuals from whom DNA can be collected. In 2013, the Supreme Court allowed

245. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 452 (1990) (contending that a “[l]ocalist ideology . . . crippl[es] the
willingness of states to take a statewide perspective and displace local authority when considerations of equity or efficiency make it appropriate to do so.”).
246. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
247. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1251 (2012) (stating that “the Court hears fewer cases
these days than in any other time in [its] modern history” and providing data in support).
Courts, moreover, have rejected claims that variable laws within a state raise equal protection
concern. E.g., Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 230 (1964); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S.
22, 31 (1880); City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 661 So. 2d 445, 451 (La. 1995).
248. See Davidson, supra note 176, at 604 (identifying as a key defining feature of local
agencies the “permeability of the line between public and private within local agencies”); id.
at 608 (discussing infusion of private actors in work of local agencies).
249. See Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data,
101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 547 (2016).
250. See Murphy, supra note 43, at 536 (“Most technological surveillance devices are developed, marketed, and maintained by private sector industries, not nonprofit or government
entities.”); Matt Richtel, A Police Gadget That Tracks Phones? Shhh! It’s Secret, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/a-police-gadget-tracksphones-shhh-its-secret.html [https://perma.cc/3TCN-BZ66] (discussing promotion and sale of
“StingRay” devices to local departments, which are used to track the location of cell phones
without a warrant).
251. Kreag, supra note 208, at 1507 (quoting Bode Technology Vice President for Sales
and Marketing).
252. Id. at 1502–03.
253. Id. at 1512.
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police, acting without a warrant, to secure DNA from those arrested for “serious offenses.”254 Expanding this limit would have obvious benefits for industry. As Jason
Kreag has observed:
Large [DNA database] firms . . . view local law enforcement databases
as potential revenue streams, particularly because they promise to promote the use of DNA beyond violent crimes (sexual assaults and homicides) to property crimes. These firms see a business opportunity in processing the evidence swabs collected from property crimes. Indeed, in
marketing their products, they trumpet the studies that have highlighted
DNA’s promise for solving these crimes.255
A locality, hearing the combined pitch of police administrators and business interests, understandably would be susceptible of persuasion in favor of expansion.256
Collection of familial DNA samples, which allow police to use the DNA of innocents
to identify suspects,257 would likely follow a similar path. Yet experience teaches
that any political resistance to these policy shifts would most likely come from those
most directly affected, politically marginalized segments of the locality without
much influence.258
B. Experimentation
Another touted benefit of localism is its capacity to foster experimentation.259
Just as “a single courageous State may . . . serve as a laboratory” and undertake
“novel social and economic experiments” from which other states can draw
lessons, 260 so too can local governments. 261 Recently, the construct made famous

254. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465 (2013).
255. Kreag, supra note 208, at 1521.
256. Risk of political capture, it should be noted, is perhaps especially pronounced at the
local government level, with its typical smaller-sized, unicameral legislative structure and
lesser participatory democracy and lack of checks and balances, compared to bicameral bodies
operative in the state and federal reams. See Kazis, supra note 181, at 69–73. Possibly exacerbating matters, local legislative elections are also less subject to partisan competition, compared to their state and federal legislative counterparts. See Schleicher, supra note 173. Local
elections are also often marked by lower voter turnout. See supra note 182.
257. Wayne A. Logan, Government Retention and Use of Unlawfully Secured DNA Evidence, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 269, 277 (2015).
258. See supra notes 132–144 and accompanying text; see also Kreag, supra note 208, at
1539 (“[T]he local citizens who perceive the positive benefits of a local DNA database—reduced crime—are more than likely not the same citizens who bear the burdens of local databases.”).
259. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1487, 1498 (1987) (“decentralization allows for innovation and competition in government” and provides sub-federal entities “greater opportunity and incentive to
pioneer useful changes”).
260. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
261. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1,
43 (2006) (noting that “if the fifty states are laboratories for public policy formation, then
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by Justice Brandeis has figured in Professors Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel’s
“democratic experimentalism,”262 whereby “power is decentralized to enable
citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their
individual circumstance,” with the solutions shared regionally and nationally. 263
Presuming that one accepts that constitutional rights are ripe for experimentation,264 the viability of the model rests on several key assumptions. One is that a
local decision-making unit possesses expertise to formulate and implement policy
worthy of deference.265 As John Rappaport has noted, however, the assumptions
underlying this purported superiority in the policing context are “contingent and
qualified.” 266 This is so for several reasons, including that political influences “may
cause policy makers ‘to use the information they possess in distorted ways’”; 267 the
tendency of law enforcement to undervalue individual rights; 268 and the lack of
expertise of most politicians in policing matters. 269 Indeed, lending prescriptive
weight to local expertise can be seen as especially problematic today. As leading
policing scholar David Bayley has observed, “[s]ince the 1980s, the challenges of
managing the police have become dramatically more complex in ways that are not
recognized either by the police or the public.”270 According to Bayley, “[t]he public
is now demanding a voice in policing at precisely the moment that policing has
become unprecedentedly more complicated.”271
Professor Michael Livermore, in his recent article The Perils of
Experimentation, echoes this concern, noting that the benefits of “inquiry cannot
be carried out in the abstract, and sound analysis must be based on careful attention
to a wide range of policy and political dynamics.” 272 He urges “a healthy dose of

surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide logarithmically more opportunities for innovation, experimentation and reform”).
262. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
263. Id. at 267.
264. But see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (“I
have never believed that under the guise of federalism the States should be able to experiment
with protections afforded our citizens through the Bill of rights.”); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 338 (1921) (“The Constitution was intended, its very purpose was, to prevent experimentation with the fundamental rights of the individual.”).
265. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in
the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 82 (2011) (“Experimentalism emphasizes stakeholder participation to elicit and reconcile the diverse views and interests of people distinctively affected by and knowledgeable about the matters in issue.”).
266. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 232.
267. Id. at 233 (quoting ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 86–87
(2009)).
268. Id.
269. Id.; see also SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 8
(2005) (noting that most elected officials lack expertise in policing matters).
270. David H. Bayley, The Complexities of 21st Century Policing, 10 POLICING 163, 163
(2016); id. at 166 (“[I]t is obvious that the management of policing has become dramatically
more complicated in ways that are not generally recognized.”).
271. Id. at 170.
272. Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 708 (2017);

2018]

F OUR TH A ME NDME NT LOCA LISM

401

public choice skepticism concerning how information will be put to use,”273 citing
policing as an example. 274 Although he does not elaborate, Livermore is justified.
As commentators have long recognized, the political pathologies at play in the
criminal justice policy-making process are acute and pervasive.275 With policing in
particular, jurisdictions have incentive to adopt aggressive policies that are
inhospitable to perceived undesirables.276 Increasingly pronounced social and
economic segregation within and between localities,277 certainly inclusive of
suburban enclaves,278 exacerbates the phenomenon.
Another basic concern relates to the viability of the experimentalist model itself.
Over thirty years ago, Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman recognized that political
leaders, wary of negative results possibly attending an experiment, will free-ride on

see also id. at 666 (“[I]t is worth inquiring into whether the relevant policy context is one in
which the creation of information is likely to have salutary effects on the policymaking process
. . . . where there is little potential benefit and greater downside risk, enthusiasm for experimentation should wane.”).
273. Id. at 652.
274. Id. at 658–59; see also Briffault, supra note 234, at 115 (“The sharp differences
among local governments and the concomitant differences in local needs and abilities render
general claims about the value, as well as the extent, of local autonomy difficult to sustain. . .
. [O]nce the political and economic setting in which contemporary local governments function
is considered, the normative case for localism becomes considerably less compelling.”).
275. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
276. See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control,
and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1834 (2005). Research by Adam
Winkler examining state, local, and federal laws challenged on free speech grounds reflects
this parochial local tendency, which Professor Winkler attributed to a desire “to please locally
powerful interest groups by restricting the speech of disfavored minorities.” Adam Winkler,
Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 179–80 (2009). Winkler concluded:
The problem is that choice and diversity are not necessarily values that should be
encouraged when it comes to fundamental rights. The right to free speech is supposed to be enjoyed equally by all citizens, regardless of their place of residence.
In the traditional understanding of the First Amendment, the citizen choice that
is valued is that which comes from unfettered debate in the marketplace of ideas.
If state and local governments can restrict speech, the channels of dialogue are
restricted and choice diminished, not enhanced.
Id. at 183.
277. See Claude S. Fischer, Gretchen Stockmayer, Jon Stiles & Micahel Hout, Distinguishing the Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 1960–
2000, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 54 (2004); Daniel T. Lichter, Domenico Parisi & Michael C.
Taquino, Toward a New Macro-Segregation? Decomposing Segregation Within and Between
Metropolitan Cities and Suburbs, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 843, 844 (2015).
278. On the impact of land use controls, tax policy, and the like with particular regard to
the creation and proliferation of suburbs, see COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS
AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN CITY 9–10 (2009); SIDNEY PLOTKIN, KEEP OUT: THE
STRUGGLE OF LAND USE CONTROL (1987). Not all suburbs, of course, are the same in their
socioeconomic or racial composition as the concept “melting pot suburbs” denotes. WILLIAM
H. FREY, DIVERSITY EXPLOSION: HOW NEW RACIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ARE REMAKING AMERICA
159 (2014).
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the experiments of others.279 Risk of free-riding, Professors Brian Galle and Joseph
Leahy observed more recently, is especially likely when the policy or practice in
question is relatively easy to replicate.280
Professor Slobogin acknowledges that not all local governments will have the
wherewithal to generate their own policies,281 and will “piggyback on policies developed by their larger counterparts and other policy organs.”282 When this occurs, however, the public participation and tailoring that proponents posit as critically important is short circuited,283 and jurisdictions could well adopt ill-suited policies.284
Worse yet, policies might remain in place as a result of ossification, a problem long
recognized by administrative law scholars.285
On the other hand, if in fact localities do engage in experimentation, there can be
difficulties. As a threshold matter, they might not learn of one another’s experiments
and outcomes. Professor Hannah Wiseman, echoing concerns of other scholars,286
has noted the problem of “regulatory islands,” which lack necessary information on
“the suite of potential policy approaches already tried or proposed—not to mention
information about implementation processes and the results of policy processes.”287
With policing policy in particular, there is reason to expect that localities will engage
in competiveness,288 not the cooperative spirit necessary for sharing to take place.289

279. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 615–16 (1980); see also Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207, 208 (2002)
(“Experiments benefit not just the innovating government but also potential imitators, and so
local governments have an incentive to free-ride off their neighbors.”).
280. Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1346 (2009).
281. See Slobogin, supra note 15, at 135.
282. Id.; see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16, at 1888 (“[I]t is simply not the
case that each local department is going to have to draft a set of rules from the ground up.
There already are examples of model rules governing many aspects of policing. . . . These
rules may serve as a model for other communities. Most likely there will be convergence toward best practices.”); Rappaport, supra note 17, at 246 (“[W]e should not expect, in practice,
to see as many constitutional rule sets as there are law enforcement jurisdictions.”).
283. See supra notes 120–131, 157–167 and accompanying text.
284. Cf. Dru Stevenson, Costs of Codification, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1129, 1172 (2014)
(noting that borrowing by states of codified codes “[i]n the criminal context . . . is particularly
problematic, because legislative borrowing makes penal law and sanctions too far removed
from local community values and needs”).
285. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1494 (2012) (noting that “[o]ssification is a real problem that has a wide variety of serious adverse effects.”).
286. See, e.g., Galle & Leahy, supra note 280, at 1351 (questioning the “assumption that
jurisdictions can easily obtain information about the experiments of others”); Matthew C.
Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1423
(2011) (recognizing that governmental actors need but often lack information regarding the
“likely consequences of different courses of action”).
287. Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1691 (2014).
288. See Teichman, supra note 276, at 1836.
289. As former New York and Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton put it: “We don’t
[cooperate]. Law enforcement is the most turf-based institution in America. And when you
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The experiments themselves, moreover, can present another concern: an indeterminacy of scale problem. While advocates do not specify which level of government,
or entity, should bear responsibility for norm creation, they appear to focus on municipalities,290 which number in the tens of thousands.291 Local constitutionalists, for
their part, appear amenable to accepting neighborhoods292 or even sublocal “special
purpose institutions” as worthy norm-creators.293 If the goal is to ensure participation
and optimize the likelihood of consensus,294 micro-ization of political unit is sensible,295 yet as noted earlier even defining “community” can be pose major challenges.296
Presuming this definitional challenge is surmounted, the multitude of local preferences will present major practical difficulty.297 Professor John Rappaport acknowledges the risk of creating “a patchwork of regulations that will be unduly complex
and difficult for the Court to oversee,”298 embroiling the judiciary in a “Whac-amole” scenario of perpetually reviewing policies.299 But he dismisses this as “really
an objection to our federal system, in which state and local authorities exercise police
powers. Regulation of law enforcement is not a uniquely federal concern that cannot
be effectively treated without national intervention.”300

have upwards of 19,000 separate police forces in a purposely decentralized law-enforcement
environment, it’s a lot of individual turf to protect.” Robert Keough, Bill Bratton on the New
Crime Paradigm, COMMONWEALTH (Jan. 1, 2002), http://commonwealthmagazine.org
/uncategorized/bill-bratton-on-the-new-crime-paradigm [https://perma.cc/E4XD-XGND].
290. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16, at 1854; Meares & Kahan, supra note
10, at 211; Slobogin, supra note 15, at 126, 135.
291. See HOGUE, supra note 49.
292. Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 460–61 (2001)
(“The logic of neighborhood constitutionalism requires that states defer to city norms, . . . and
that neighborhoods defer to block-level norms as long as the criteria for deference are met.”).
For an early argument in favor of a neighborhood-level system of governance, including police
functions, see Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973).
293. Gerken, supra note 44, at 29.
294. JEFFREY M. BERRY, KENT E. PORTNEY & KEN THOMSON, REBIRTH OF URBAN
DEMOCRACY 95–98 (1993) (urging use of neighborhood councils for this reason); Matthew J.
Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New
Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 180–81 (2008).
295. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1349 (2014) (noting presumption guided by “instinctive belief that smaller is more beautiful”).
296. See supra notes 132–144 and accompanying text (discussing varied definitions of
“community”); see also STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE
LIMITS OF COMMUNITY 55, 72–89 (2006) (noting that police departments define “community”
differently than residents); Burke, supra note 141, at 1004 (“[I]t is not obvious that residents
of a geographically-defined region comprise a ‘community’ in anything other than the most
superficial sense.”).
297. See Taslitz, supra note 11, at 302 (“Of course, there are administrative costs associated with having local variations in rules, and those can be reasons to prohibit such variations
in some instances.”).
298. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 246.
299. Id. at 261.
300. Id. at 246.
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Increased judicial caseloads, however, will not be the only problem. Localism
eliminates a key benefit of traditional federalism—it provides a hierarchical order
for decisional deference: federal law (when it applies) is supreme, otherwise states
hold sway. With localism, states are no longer privileged in the federalism equation,301 leaving the multitude of non-sovereign (or at best semi-sovereign) local political units to govern preferences.302 When this occurs the power of states to order
their own internal governance structures is undermined,303 something the Supreme
Court has frowned upon.304 At the same time, cutting states out of the political oversight dynamic has risks of its own, as seen in the ways by which local policing policy
has been driven by funding and equipment directly provided by federal agencies.305
C. Tiebout Sorting and Externalities
Closely related to experimentation is the expectation that decentralization will increase the menu of governmental policies from which a mobile citizenry can
choose.306 Under political scientist Charles Tiebout’s famous model, individuals will
“vote with their feet” and live in areas aligned with their public good preferences.307
This in turn, the theory goes, will result in efficient sorting of preferable government

301. See Davidson, supra note 235, at 980 (“The prevailing view of local governments is
one of formal legal powerlessness, subject to plenary state authority. In the federalism context,
this view takes the states as unitary entities within which local governments serve as merely
convenient instrumentalities of the states, imbued with, at best, reflected sovereignty.”). But
see Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 964–
78 (2010) (noting cases where Supreme Court attributed local governments semi-sovereign or
at least autonomous status).
302. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 235, at 977 n.62 (“It would be possible to argue that
localities have no constitutional status whatsoever, but this Article describes their status as
‘quasi-constitutional’ in recognition of the independent role that the Court has, at times, accorded local governments in constitutional law.”).
303. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“Through the structure of its
government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines
itself as a sovereign.”).
304. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (renouncing federal capacity to
“turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of
the State against its will”); see also Davidson, supra note 235, at 986 (noting that “the Court
is increasingly intimating that internal political ordering is a fundamental attribute of state
sovereignty” and citing cases in support). But see id. at 999–1000 (citing and discussing instances where the Court upheld interferences with ordering of state-local relations).
305. Harmon, supra note 2, at 872.
306. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
307. Tiebout, supra note 51, at 418 (“[A]t the local level . . . the consumer-voter moves to
that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences.”).
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policies,308 and a higher degree of overall preference satisfaction,309 as local governments “compete” for residents.310 Individuals unhappy with a policy can exercise
what Albert Hirschman termed an “exit option.”311
Here, presuming the existence of actual policy variation,312 localism proponents
enjoy an important practical advantage insofar as it is typically easier and less costly
to exit a locality than it is to exit a state or nation.313 Noting this, Professor Robert
Cooter has gone so far as to argue that “[t]he ‘exit principle’ implies the ‘federalism
of individual rights,’ by which I mean that courts should tolerate more interference
with individual liberty when the effects are localized.”314
Although influential, Tiebout’s “pure theory” has been criticized over the years.315
One concern is that exit is often directly related to economic wherewithal,316 a point

308. Id.; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in
Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 944–45 (1988) (positing that ease of exit at the
local level “underlies de Tocqueville’s esteem for decentralized administration” and that “exit
from a locality that has acted invidiously is largely salutary, as it informs the original municipality that its policies require reform”).
309. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 11–13 (1972).
310. See Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 332, 382 (2003).
311. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 2 (1970); see also Richard Posner, Free Speech in an
Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1986) (arguing that local regulation of
speech is less likely to be onerous because exit is an option); Carol M. Rose, Planning and
Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837,
882–87 (1983) (discussing exit in context of local control of land use decisions).
312. See supra Part II.A, B.
313. See Rosen, Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1606–07 (“In general, it is easier to
exit smaller polities than larger polities,” given the greater moving costs associated with distance of a change of residence, and less disruption to work, social, family, and other practical
accoutrements of daily life).
314. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 323 (2000); see also Rosen,
Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1610–11 (“Generally speaking, there is less need for
judicially enforced constitutional protections at lower levels of government, where exit
costs are lower.”); Kevin J. Worthen, Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Potential Normative
Power of American Cities and Indian Tribes, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1285 (1991) (“Because withdrawal from the local community is easier . . . it is less distasteful for a local
government to subject its members to community decisions. People who disagree with the
choices of a particular community can seek a community more compatible with their values
or they can choose to live in no community at all.”).
315. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 515–18 (1991); Jerry
Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 267–72 (1993); Paul W. Rhode
& Koleman S. Strumpf, Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity
from 1850 to 1990, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1648 (2003).
316. See Briffault, supra note 245, at 420 (noting that mobility “is constrained by a variety of economic . . . factors that tend to affect poorer people more than affluent ones”).
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with particular salience with policing given its predominant focus on poor and minority community members.317 Another is the failure of Tiebout’s model to take sufficient account of the ways in which local policies impose negative externalities, or
spillovers, on other localities.318
Unlike lower taxes, public parks, and the like, which Tiebout posited as bases to
attract “consumer-voters,” criminal justice policy can be motivated by a desire to
expel.319 As a consequence, the prospect of exit does not function to temper policy
overreach.320 Rather, exit—of potential undesirables—could well be the goal. If
crime-prone individuals (whether residents or visitors) commit crimes elsewhere,321
the displacement qualifies as a negative externality or spillover,322 militating
against localization. 323 The upshot is that local governments, while often oblivious
to their externalities, 324 in this instance have an affirmative interest in generating

317. Although criminal procedure rights might seem an unlikely motivating factor in
voting with one’s feet, it is not unprecedented, as evidenced in the migration of southern
African-Americans to the North from the late nineteenth through the mid-late twentieth
century. See DANIEL M. J OHNSON & REX R. CAMPBELL, BLACK M IGRATION IN AMERICA: A
SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC HISTORY 84–85 (1981).
318. See Briffault, supra note 245, at 426–27; Richard Schragger, Consuming Government,
101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1834 (2003). Suffice it to say, not all externalities are negative in
nature. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal
Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 62–63 (2014) (arguing that political units can, by adopting
a minority position, such as with gay rights, “generate friction” and “spur[] democratic engagement”).
319. See supra notes 198–206 and accompanying text.
320. See Rosen, Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1611 (identifying as an optimal
condition for tailoring “the threat of exit tam[ing] polities’ policy choice”).
321. See ELIZABETH NEWLON, SPILLOVER CRIME AND JURISDICTIONAL EXPENDITURE ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT: A MUNICIPAL LEVEL ANALYSIS (2001); Kate J. Bowers & Shane D.
Johnson, Measuring the Geographical Displacement and Diffusion Benefit Effects of Crime
Prevention Activity, 19 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 275 (2003); William C. Wheaton,
Metropolitan Fragmentation, Law Enforcement Effort and Urban Crime, 60 J. URB. ECON. 1
(2006).
322. On spillovers resulting from decentralization more generally see, for example,
Briffault, supra note 191, at 1321 (“[V]irtually by definition, an increase in decentralization
increases the possibility of spillovers” that impose costs on unrepresented parties.); Samuel
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1355
(2006) (recognizing situations “when the experiments of democracy within one state’s borders
have spillover effects that adversely affect citizens of other states”).
323. See Guillaume Cheikbossian & Nicolas Marceau, Why Is Law Enforcement Decentralized? 3 (CIRPEE, Working Paper No. 07-19, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007699 [https://perma.cc/CFT3-CBS2] (“[W]e note that
provided law enforcement entails displacement or diffusion, then it is likely that there would
be benefits to its centralization as a central authority could internalize negative—spatial
displacement— . . . externalities between regions.”); see also Briffault, supra note 245, at
427–28 (“Thus, full internalization of all local actions and full participation for all those
affected by local decisions would tend to require larger local units. Yet both economic and
political localism are predicated on the smallness of local governments.”).
324. See Briffault, supra note 245, at 434 (“Local governments will not, as long as they
need not, take extralocal effects into account, give a voice to nonresidents affected by local
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them. Indeed, to the extent a policy renders a jurisdiction more attractive to
potential capital investment,325 one should expect to see a race-to-the-bottom
scenario familiar in other contexts. 326 Left unchecked, local control over police,
and judicial deference to local policy, could well engender a toxic state of affairs
long ago envisioned by political scientist James Q. Wilson whereby police are
made an “instrument of inter-neighborhood conflict.”327
Nor, finally, should such externalities be conceived in insular terms. Given the
transitoriness of modern life, nonresidents traveling to or through a jurisdiction
will feel the effects of policy. As Professor Richard Briffault observes:
[P] eople are regularly involved in more than one locality in the course
of their daily lives. We are not just a mobile society; we are also a
commuter society. Most people no longer reside in the locality in which
they work, and they no longer confine their weekly travel, shopping,
social, cultural or other routine activities to the community in which they
reside.328
Functionally, people who pass through are political outsiders who, even though
their liberty and privacy can be negatively affected by a policy, will likely have no
say in its creation.329 Indeed, it could be the case that outsiders are singled out for

actions, internalize externalities, make compensatory payments for negative spillovers or
transfer local wealth to other communities in the region to ameliorate fiscal disparities.”).
325. See Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, Competition in Law Enforcement and Capital Allocation, 69 J. URB. ECON. 136, 137 (2011).
326. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance,
95 VA. L. REV. 685 (2009). Competition here is not fueled by a desire to loosen regulation,
such as occurs when localities wish to lure an industry; rather, competitiveness manifests in
localities adopting harsher regulations to make themselves less attractive to potential offenders.
327. JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND
ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 283–91 (2d ed. 1978).
328. Briffault, supra note 245, at 413. Jerry Frug has written that we should attach less
significance to boundaries, urging recognition of a “postmodern conception of localities” that
will encompass individuals’ nonresidential connections, such as to employment locations,
schools, and social ties. Frug, supra note 315, at 304–38.
329. Briffault supra note 245, at 426–27 (“[L]ocal borders cut across densely packed and
economically and socially intertwined metropolitan areas, virtually guaranteeing that there
will be externalities and that some people, namely nonresidents, will be excluded from participating in the decisions of one of the region’s many local governments though they are intimately affected by these decisions.”); cf. Anderson, supra note 301, at 933 (noting how local
borders can change to exclude certain citizen subpopulations); Richard Thompson Ford, The
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1860–
61 (1994) (arguing that permitting local governments to demarcate boundaries and self-define
can result in exclusion and racial oppression).
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targeting,330 neutralizing the internalization of policy effects that Kahan and Meares
regard as a critical tempering influence.331
IV. WHITHER FOURTH AMENDMENT LOCALISM
As noted at the outset, the viability of localism must be assessed in terms of its
actual workings, not simply hypothesized classroom discussion. 332 In this vein, it
is worth acknowledging that even stalwart proponents can be less than categorical
in their support. Professor Rosen, for instance, writes that we should merely “soften
the categorical presumption of One-Size-Fits-All to a rebuttable presumption, so
that the merits of One-Size-Fits-All versus Tailoring can be examined in the
incremental manner that is the common law’s wisdom.” 333 Rosen thus leaves open
whether “every constitutional guarantee” is amenable to tailoring.334 Professor
Blocher is similarly qualified, writing that “there is a general presumption in favor
of national [rights] uniformity, and the reasons for diverging from that uniformity
are always specific to the right involved.” 335 “[T]he question of whether any
particular right should be locally tailored is ultimately a specific and normative
one.”336
This Part considers whether the Fourth Amendment is one such constitutional
zone. Concluding that it is not as a general matter, discussion then turns to consideration of whether in some shape or form tailoring, and the localism on which it
depends, holds promise.

330. Such a prospect would be especially likely when a locality stands to secure financial
benefit, such as with the forfeiture of property like vehicles. See, e.g., Horton v. City of
Oakland, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 375 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Oakland vehicle forfeiture
program and noting that “the adverse effect of the ordinance on transient citizens of the state”
does not “outweigh the benefit to the municipality”). Aggressive targeting of nonlocal motorists for traffic tickets affords another obvious example. See, e.g., Tony Briscoe & Joe Mahr,
Suburban Speed Traps? See Where Out-of-Towners Are Most Likely To Get Ticketed, CHI.
TRIB. (June 10, 2016, 11:28 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-speeding-ticketsnon-residents-met-20160609-story.html [https://perma.cc/MG9T-VA5X?type=image].
331. See supra Part II.A.
332. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
333. Rosen, Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1637.
334. Id. at 1516; see also id. at 1611 (asking “should every constitutional guarantee be
amenable to Tailoring? Are there any firm floors below which a constitutional protection could
not be Tailored? If so, what justifies them?”).
335. Blocher, supra note 33, at 132; see also Gerken, supra note 44, at 59 (advocating the
“maintaining [of] a decentralized system but fighting out, issue-by-issue, the areas where we
think national values cannot be compromised”); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness,
NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness
[https://perma.cc/XBF4-7QT4] (“[N]ationaliz[ing] an issue in the name of the Constitution
calls for an exercise of judgment . . . [in cases where] uniform national policy would override
differences.”).
336. Blocher, supra note 33, at 88; see also id. at 127 (noting that instances to date of
doctrinal tailoring “can be explained based on considerations specific to the right at issue”).
Professor Nestor Davidson, in urging “localist administrative law,” likewise cautions
against reflexive trans-substantive application. Davidson, supra note 176, at 610.
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A. Fourth Amendment Exceptionalism
The Fourth Amendment is the most commonly litigated constitutional provision, 337 not simply because of the many millions of searches and seizures
conducted by police annually, 338 but because of the important role it plays in
protecting individual rights and enabling operation of American constitutional
democracy.
1. Individual Interests
The Amendment’s structural role in limiting the power of police to intrude on
individuals’ lives is of obvious critical importance. 339 Being searched or seized by
police amounts to an accusation of criminal wrongdoing, with understandable traumatic effect.340 One must submit to forcible domination by a government agent,341
even when actually innocent of any wrongdoing.342

337. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
xix (2014).
338. In 2014, police executed more than eleven million arrests, a conservative number
because the data exclude arrests for many less serious offenses. Crime in the United States
2014: Persons Arrested, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-arrested/main [https://perma.cc/QF2Z-5B8F]. An
estimated forty million people had contact with police in 2008. CHRISTINE EITH & M ATTHEW
R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC, 2008 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf [https://perma
.cc/63R3-J8WQ].
339. See David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not To Think About Privacy
and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1113 (noting that the Fourth
Amendment helps ensure “respect that others, including governmental officers, show for an
individual’s sphere of personal sovereignty. Violations of that respect are important not just
as a matter of principle but because of the tangible effects they can have both on the victim’s
sense of security and peace of mind”).
340. William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1064 (1995) (“The real harm . . . arises from the indignity of being publicly
singled out as a criminal suspect and the fear that flows from being targeted by uniformed,
armed police officers.”); see also Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1486–87 (1996).
341. Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1489; see also Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249, 1276 (2012) (“When the police stop a person on the street or in
her car and search either, or when they enter and search a home by virtue of at least the color
of authority, they say, essentially, ‘I have power over you.’”).
342. Innocents, however, understandably experience particular aggrievement. Hugo M.
Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic Analysis, 24
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 22, 27 (2007) (asserting that dignitary cost suffered by search of the innocent is greater than the guilty because the latter “cannot feel as badly that this penalty was not
deserved”). Data collected in connection with the New York City Police Department’s “stop
and frisk” policy attest to this reality. During an eight-year period (2004–2012) police conducted 4.4 million investigative detentions, performing weapons frisks more than half the time,
yet, had very low “hit rates” (less than 1% for illegal weapons and 12% for any wrongdoing
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Even being stopped by police when driving can be an “invasive, frightening, and
humiliating” experience.343 Being subject to an investigative detention on the street
similarly denies personal autonomy and freedom of movement,344 and can lead to a
“frisk” for weapons,345 described by the Court as a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment.”346
An arrest is even more intrusive, coercive, and embarrassing,347 and provides police the automatic right to search the arrestee’s body and “grab area.”348 When taken
to a detention facility, which is often unsanitary and dangerous,349 arrestees can be
subject to a strip search, even if no reason exists to suspect they possess a weapon or
contraband.350 During the booking process authorities can forcibly compel blood and
DNA samples containing highly personal information,351 which the Supreme Court
has acknowledged can foster “anxiety” among those targeted.352 An arrest can have
a variety of immediate financial hardships353 and time away from work can jeopardize employment.354 It can also adversely affect housing, occupational licensure, and
student loan opportunities,355 impacting arrestees and their dependents alike.356

whatsoever). Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Survey results highlight the significant negative psychological and emotional impact on those
targeted, aggravated by the use of force and the feeling of being singled out due to one’s race.
Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler & Bruce G. Link, Aggressive Policing and the
Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2321 (2014).
343. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
344. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1309 (1990).
345. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
346. Id. at 17; see also id. at 24–25 (“Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security . . . .”).
347. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing arrest as “a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty
or innocent”); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (describing arrest as “a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty . . . disrupt his employment,
drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create
anxiety in him, his family and his friends”).
348. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 235 (1973).
349. See, e.g., Matt Pearce, Missouri Cities, Including Ferguson, Sued over ‘Grotesque’
Jail Conditions, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-naferguson-lawsuit-20150209-story.html [https://perma.cc/X6LT-WFKM].
350. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 339 (2012).
351. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177–78 (2016).
352. Id. at 2178 (noting that a blood draw “places in the hands of law enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from which it is possible to extract information beyond
a simple [blood alcohol concentration] reading. Even if the law enforcement agency is precluded from testing the blood for any purpose other than to measure [alcohol content], the
potential remains and may result in anxiety for the person tested.”).
353. Logan & Wright, supra note 207, at 1177.
354. Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 313–14 (2016) (noting various adverse financial consequences of arrest).
355. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1107–
09 (2013).
356. Harmon, supra note 354, at 316–17.

2018]

F OUR TH A ME NDME NT LOCA LISM

411

Finally, not only can arrestees expect to be publicly shamed by having their “mug
shot” posted on websites operated by police departments,357 newspapers,358 and other
commercial entities.359 They run the risk of suffering physical harm360 and even
death.361
2. Structural Democratic Interests
More broadly, the Fourth Amendment protects a cluster of interests that are integral to the functioning of civil society. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Wolf v.
Colorado, where the Court deemed the Fourth Amendment “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,”362 “[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.”363 The Fourth Amendment, as Professor Morgan Cloud observed,
operates in a concrete dimension, regulating the power of government to
intrude physically upon people and their property. But it also operates in
a more abstract dimension . . . [It] enacts a vision of the individual as an
autonomous agent, empowered to act and believe and express himself
free from government interference.364
By its terms, the Amendment protects “the people.”365 Without its protection,
even the factually innocent—the “group for whom the Fourth Amendment’s protections ought to be most jealously guarded”366—can be deterred from public engagement,367 refraining from going places, engaging in certain behaviors, or meeting with

357. Jess Bidgood, After Arrests, Quandary for Police on Posting Booking Photos, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/after-arrests-quandary-forpolice-on-posting-booking-photos.html [https://perma.cc/2V73-72RY].
358. See, e.g., MUGSHOTS GAINESVILLE, http://mugshotsgainesville.com [https://perma.cc/
UR29-R6J8] (website containing pictures and information regarding individuals “taken into
custody by local law enforcement”).
359. See, e.g., Most Recent Florida Bookings, ARRESTS.ORG, http://florida.arrests.org
[http://perma.cc/6TMV-QSFE].
360. Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of
Force 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 2016) (noting resort by
police to slapping, grabbing, and pushing individuals into the wall or onto the ground).
361. Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 160 n.1 (2016) (citing recent instances of deadly force).
362. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
363. Id.; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23 (2003) (“The Fourth Amendment protects core interests essential to human flourishing, interests in privacy, property, and freedom of movement.”).
364. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property,
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 619 (1996).
365. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects . . . shall not be violated . . . .”).
366. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013); see also Colb, supra note 340, at 1476–
1502; Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81
MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1244–48 (1983); Reinert, supra note 341, at 1491–93.
367. What Jane Bambauer recently called being subject to “hassle”: “the chance that the
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particular individuals.368 When covert surveillance by police is involved, the effect
can at once be more subtle and pervasive.369 As Justice Sotomayor recently noted, in
the context of government use of a GPS tracking device placed on a suspect’s car,
“[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”370
On the streets, the Fourth Amendment guards against police behaviors that can be
corrosive of community. In some communities, police officers can be the only governmental representatives with whom residents regularly interact.371 When this is so,
and police behave in a manner thought unfair, there can come disenchantment with
“the system,” diminishing community members’ willingness to engage in civic
life,372 including voting.373 Disengagement can also have a negative effect on public
safety, undermining neighborhood collective efficacy in deterring crime374 and reducing individuals’ inclination to assist police.375
In short, reading the Amendment in isolation, simply in the criminal procedure
context, in Akhil Amar’s words, gives short shrift to “how the Fourth Amendment

police will stop or search an innocent person against his will.” Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113
MICH. L. REV. 461, 464 (2015); see also id. at 466 (“Hassle measures how much pain an investigatory program will impose on the innocent even when the program is moderately successful at detecting crime.”).
368. See LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 104
(2006) (noting that minorities in particular engage in aversive behaviors “to avoid being detained becom[ing] a part of their daily lives” (emphasis omitted)); L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1520
(2011) (noting how the “limited nature of constitutional protections against government
searches . . . deters law-abiding persons from engaging in behavior that is not barred under the
criminal code”).
369. See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Privacy as the Central Value Protected by
the Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 143,
162 (2015) (“Widespread technological surveillance clearly has stultifying effects, effects that
are best described as a consequence of feeling that one has no privacy or anonymity.”).
370. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also
Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 127 (2008) (defining insecurity as
“the stifling apprehension and oppression that people would justifiably experience if forced to
live their personal lives in fear of appearing ‘suspicious’ in the eyes of the state”). For social
science research supporting this point, see Nicole B. Cásarez, The Synergy of Privacy and
Speech, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 813, 853–59 (2016).
371. See AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE
DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 55–56 (2014).
372. Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Staying Out of Sight?: Concentrated Policing
and Local Political Action, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jan. 2014, at 202, 206;
Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren’t What They Seem: Context and Cognition in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 97, 105 (2012).
373. LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 371, at 222–23.
374. See Robert J. Sampson, Neighborhood Effects, Causal Mechanisms, and the Social
Structure of the City, in ANALYTIC SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS 227, 232 (Pierre
Demeulenaere ed., 2011).
375. See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING
PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002) (discussing how negative citizen
interactions with police and police misconduct can lessen citizen willingness to assist police).
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connects up with the rest of the Constitution.”376 As Professor Monrad Paulsen recognized over fifty years ago: “All the other freedoms, freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion, of political action, pre-suppose that arbitrary and capricious police
action has been restrained.”377
3. Comparative Distinctiveness
The Fourth Amendment’s distinctiveness is also evidenced by comparing its constitutional role and application with the First and Second Amendments, the chief
points of reference for constitutional localists.378
As noted at the outset, whether material is obscene, and hence undeserving of
First Amendment protection, is determined on a community-by-community basis.379
The government’s power to intrude on a person’s First Amendment right is, however,
protected by an important institutional body: the jury (both grand and petit). A jury,
comprised of individuals residing in the local vicinage, decides whether the material
challenged is obscene.380 Juries, since the nation’s origin have guarded against government overreach,381 including perhaps most especially in the freedom of expression
context, as witnessed in Framing Era prosecutions for seditious libel.382 By comparison, courts alone decide whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment in a
criminal case.383

376. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES
2 (1997). Indeed, it is no coincidence that the Framing Era search of John Wilkes, a polemicist
targeted by the British crown for criminal libel, figured centrally in the creation of both the
First and Fourth Amendments. Sacharoff, supra note 341, at 1257, 1260; see also Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724–29 (1961) (recognizing historic connection between free
speech and press and police authority and noting that “unrestricted power of search and seizure
could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression”).
377. Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 255, 264 (1961); see also Crocker, supra note 115, at 308
(noting that the Fourth Amendment “protects a political ‘right of the people’ to organize community life free from pervasive government surveillance and interference”); Nadine Strossen,
The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1241 (1988) (Fourth Amendment rights
“create the environment necessary for other freedoms to flourish”).
378. On the utility and limits of constitutional “borrowing” or analogical constitutional
reasoning more generally, see Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the
First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49 (2012).
379. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
380. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974). Material is obscene if, taken as
a whole, it (1) “appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) “depicts or describes” sexual conduct in a
“patently offensive way”; and (3) “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The jury is charged with assessing the first two
prongs, with a juror “entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person
in the community or vicinage from which he comes.” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104.
381. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 335 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“The primary purpose of the jury in our legal system is to stand between the accused and the
powers of the State.”).
382. See supra note 376.
383. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR,
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An argument grounded in the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses would be equally unpersuasive. Professor Richard Schragger has
offered a compelling account of the key norm-setting, constitutional role local governments play in protecting both clauses. As he notes, “the Religion Clauses emerged
from the Founding Congress as local-protecting; the clauses were specifically meant
to prevent the national Congress from legislating religious affairs while leaving local
regulations of religion not only untouched by, but also protected from, national encroachment.”384 In this way, localization protects free exercise and prevents religious
establishment: “The decentralization of political authority—and specifically local
government—is a structural component of religious liberty.”385 The local operation
of the Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, has never been regarded as playing
such a structural role.
Finally, an analogy to the Second Amendment would lack merit for different reasons. Professor Joseph Blocher, drawing support from First Amendment-obscenity
localism,386 argues that cities should be afforded leeway to enact firearm-restrictive
laws, allowing rural areas to afford residents more Second Amendment protection.387
Blocher bases his argument on two main points. First, in general, urban and rural
areas have distinct public safety needs and “gun cultures,” politically and sociologically, with urban areas often being more amenable to imposing limits on gun possession rights.388 Second, building upon the originalist perspective used by the Court in
Heller389 and McDonald,390 Professor Blocher notes instances of what he sees as an
urban-rural dichotomy, dating back to before the Framing Era, manifest in greater
limits imposed on the rights of urban gun owners,391 owing in large part to the “particular risks of gun use in densely populated areas.”392
Assuming the accuracy of Professor Blocher’s account,393 the model lacks persuasive force here. On the sociocultural question, it remains an open question

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 10.5(b), at 613 (4th ed. 2015). Juries do of course play a role in Fourth
Amendment-based civil rights actions against police and their departments. See, e.g., Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
384. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1823 (2004).
385. Id. at 1831; see also id. at 1815 (arguing that decentralization “views local governments as valuable sites of civic association with a role in articulating local constitutional
norms”).
386. Blocher, supra note 33, at 90.
387. Id. at 104.
388. Id. at 90–107.
389. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594–95 (2008) (invalidating District
of Columbia’s ban on firearm possession in the home).
390. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 792 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(holding that Second Amendment applies to states and localities and invalidating local law
banning firearm possession in the home).
391. Blocher, supra note 33, at 108–21.
392. Id. at 99–100.
393. See Michael P. O’Shea, Why Firearm Federalism Beats Firearm Localism, 123 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 359, 365 (2014) (noting that “many of the prohibitions Blocher lists were simply
general prohibitions on discharging firearms in settled areas,” not limiting possession of firearms).
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whether geographic distinctions exist over the proper meaning and application of the
Fourth Amendment. While it might be true that individual residents of different geographic domains harbor varying views, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty
that distinct “cultures” exist.394 Nor does history provide an analytic justification for
tailoring. Even assuming the propriety of Fourth Amendment originalism,395 the historical record provides scant support for a localist orientation. While Professor
Michael Mannheimer has made a persuasive case that in 1791 federal search and
seizure authority varied significantly on the basis of subnational preferences,396 the
variability emanated from and reflected variations at the state—not the local
—level.397
*

*

*

In sum, the Fourth Amendment protects a range of critically important rights affecting individuals, their communities, and civic life more generally. This is not to
say that the First and Second Amendments do not hold equal importance. Nor is it to
say that Fourth Amendment judge-made doctrine has always been an effective guardian of citizen rights,398 or that it is the sole or perhaps even primary limit on police
behavior.399 And, certainly, Fourth Amendment doctrine should not be frozen in amber, oblivious to evolving public preferences as expressed in local democratic or administrative processes. Rather, it is to say that Fourth Amendment protections differ
in ways that counsel against judicial deference to local preference. Indeed, the differences are such that some parents, fearing for the safety of their children when
engaging with police, feel obliged to have “the talk” with them beforehand,400 a need
hard to envisage with liberties protected by the First and Second Amendments.

394. For instance, residents of perhaps more politically conservative areas, such as suburbs,
might in theory support aggressive policing and limited Fourth Amendment rights, but they
might not do so when they themselves are on the receiving end. By the same token, those of a
more libertarian bent might object in principle. See RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN
CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND PRIVACY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).
395. See supra note 113 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., M. Blane Michael, Reading
the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief That Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
905, 915 (2010) (“[T]he common law of 1791, which Justice Scalia casually refers to as though
it were a single, clearly defined body of rules, was actually derived from a variety of authorities
and differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”).
396. See Mannheimer, supra note 60, at 1232.
397. See id. Professor Mannheimer notes, moreover, that, at least until the 1930s, federal
statutory law dictated that the search and seizure power of federal agents be informed by state
law. Id. at 1290–91.
398. See supra notes 111–119 and accompanying text.
399. See Harmon, supra note 2 (noting the many rules, policies, and regulations that operate subconstitutionally on police).
400. Jeannine Amber, The Talk: How Parents Raising Black Boys Try To Keep Their Sons
Safe, TIME (July 29, 2013), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2147710,00
.html [https://perma.cc/P2Y9-RMNM].
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B. “Leveling Up” Fourth Amendment Doctrine
Having made the case that Fourth Amendment localism is ill-advised, is it foregone that strict national uniformity is the only alternative? In answering, it must first
be acknowledged that Fourth Amendment doctrinal uniformity has always been more
myth than reality. As Part I demonstrated, whether the Justices like it or not, Fourth
Amendment rights do “vary from place to place and time to time,”401 subjecting citizens to “arbitrarily variable protection.”402
This variability, what Ronald Dworkin in another context referred to as “checkerboard laws,”403 generates a number of concerns. Perhaps most important, basic rule
of law expectations are undercut. While state search and seizure constitutional norms
can and do vary,404 here it is the federal Fourth Amendment that varies, defying, in
Justice O’Connor’s words, the expectation that “a single sovereign’s laws should be
applied equally to all.”405
While troubling in principle, the variation and indeterminacy it spawns can have
major practical importance in individuals’ everyday lives. It is one thing to have
rights vary based on one’s passing into a discernible zone, such as a military base,
Indian reservation, or public school building,406 or even crossing a state jurisdictional
boundary.407 It is quite another thing, in our highly mobile society, for rights to hinge
on the inchoate bounds of “community” (or, indeed, town or city given the typical
lack of clear demarcation).408
When the nature and scope of Fourth Amendment rights vary, one “cannot know
the scope of . . . constitutional protection,”409 a deficit assuming particular importance when individuals become subject to a regulatory regime that is more rights
restrictive than they are accustomed to. More problematic still, such expectations are
subject to the vicissitudes of political branch agendas, which of course can quickly
change.

401. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 815 (1996)).
402. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004).
403. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178–84 (1986).
404. See generally Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Methodology in Search and
Seizure Cases, 77 MISS. L.J. 225 (2007) (surveying instances where state courts interpret their
state constitutions differently than the federal Fourth Amendment).
405. Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1,
4 (1984); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 130 (2001)
(noting that Americans’ “sense of national identity as a people literally constituted by the Constitution . . . [is] linked indissolubly with ideals of common constitutional rights”); Frank B.
Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243,
1249 (1999) (“A central feature of the rule of law is its horizontal consistency of application.”).
406. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
407. See Eunice Hyunhye Cho, Whose Borders? Regulating Migration Across Local and
National Boundaries, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 165, 168–69 (2010).
408. See Davidson, supra note 235, at 1024 n.284 (noting difficulty associated with distinguishing jurisdictional boundaries among suburbs, exurbs, and central cities).
409. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); see also, e.g., State v. Kock, 725 P.2d
1285, 1287 (Or. 1986) (emphasizing need for citizens to “have their constitutional rights
spelled out as clearly as possible”).
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Because of this, if Fourth Amendment localism is to have a place anywhere, it
should be when it functions in a liberty-enhancing manner. Something like this approach was advocated by Justice Stevens, who in several decisions argued that state
courts, when construing and applying the federal constitution, should be empowered
to adopt a more right-generous position than the Supreme Court.410 Justice Stevens
reasoned that state courts should, as they do when interpreting their own state constitutions, have the ability to provide their citizens with more in the way of federal
constitutional protection, allowing rights to be tailored “in the light of local conditions,”411 without impact on other states.412 According to Justice Stevens, “[f]ederal
interests are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for
its citizens than the Federal Constitution requires.”413
The approach has been endorsed by a number of commentators414 and has considerable appeal. First, while adopting it would generate constitutional variability, it
would avoid the travel-notice difficulties just noted. For example, assume that a locality acquires new technology that can, from afar, detect guns on the bodies of passersby (without touching them physically).415 Assume further that, while the question
of whether use of the device constitutes a search (requiring a warrant) has yet to
addressed by the Supreme Court,416 the local government—by means of popular vote
or a process satisfying administrative law requirements—requires that a warrant be
secured.
If police were to use the device to scan a pedestrian, without first securing a warrant, and an unlawful gun were discovered, a reviewing court would deem the warrantless search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If, on the other hand,
police failed to secure a warrant and used the device on an individual to discover an
unlawful gun in another locality, which did not elect to impose a warrant requirement, a reviewing court would not be obliged to defer to the local preference.
Such an approach would allow the benefits touted by localists—enhanced public
participation, democratic accountability, transparency, and experimentation—to accrue. With respect to the latter, for instance, local governments could experiment

410. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 200–01 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 695–97 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 396–98 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
411. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 502 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
412. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 201 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[N]o other State would have been
required to follow the [Kansas] precedent if it had been permitted to stand [by the Supreme
Court].” (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1030 (1983) (second alteration by Justice
Stevens)).
413. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring).
414. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, Countermajoritarian Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2123, 2132 (2006); Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 75–76 (2007).
415. See Thermal Matrix USA, ACT Concealed Weapon Detection System, OFFICER.COM,
http://www.officer.com/product/10050107/thermal-matrix-usa-act-concealed-weaponsdetection-system [https://perma.cc/PG9E-U59U] (describing “ACT Concealed Weapons
Detection System”).
416. But cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that use of a thermalimaging device aimed at the exterior of a home constitutes a search, requiring that police first
secure a warrant).
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with a policy that is more protective of individual rights, and, because any ill effects
of the policy would be felt most directly in the locality itself (for instance, in the form
of possibly increased criminal activity), they would actually be internalized.417
Presuming experimentalism functions as it should,418 a locality could thus serve as a
norm entrepreneur vis-à-vis other localities in a given state and other states as well.419
Finally, deferring to local rights-enhancing norms would mitigate a long-held
concern about the effect of federal constitutional incorporation doctrine, voiced most
famously by Justice John Marshall Harlan (II). In a number of Warren Court-era
decisions Harlan worried that providing “elbow room [to States] in ordering their
own criminal systems”420 would result in the watering down or dilution of federal
rights when applied to the federal government and other states.421 Under the approach
advocated no dilution would occur; indeed, if the local policy caught on elsewhere,
there would be an accumulated increase in protections.422
Adopting such an approach would of course not be immune to critique. For one
thing, it would, as Justice Scalia observed when jousting with Justice Stevens, “benefit[] criminal defendants” alone.423 It would also institutionalize disuniformity, not
only between states, but also within states, and, because infusion of the local norm
would affect the Fourth Amendment, it would bind not only state courts but federal
courts in the jurisdiction as well.424

417. See supra notes 259–265 and accompanying text; cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 280–92 (1996) (asserting that disuniformity is
not problematic so long as a state court position does not externalize costs to other states).
418. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
419. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2007) (praising local experimentation in federalism context as “political entrepreneurship”).
420. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
421. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45–46 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that
“if the Court is prepared to relax Fourth Amendment standards in order to avoid unduly fettering the States, this would be in derogation of law enforcement standards in the federal system”); see also George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 167 (2001) (maintaining that incorporation has resulted in dilution of the Bill of Rights’ original rigorous regime
of federal rights).
422. Cf. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 318, at 62–63 (arguing that interjurisdictional
norms can “generate friction, and friction has its uses in a democratic system” because it can
“spur[] democratic engagement”).
423. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Florida v.
Myers, 466 U.S. 380, 387 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to be “ever mindful
of its primary role as the protector of the citizen and not the warden or the prosecutor” and that
“[t]he Framers surely feared the latter more than the former”).
424. Cases filed in federal court, it is worth noting, often result from initial arrests executed
by state or local police enforcing state or local law. Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal
Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1245–46 (2010). Also, it is not uncommon for state,
local, and federal agents to coordinate enforcement efforts. See Wayne A. Logan, Dirty Silver
Platters: The Enduring Challenge of Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 293, 308 n.96 (2013).
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Adopting the model would also present the practical challenge of differentiating
a liberty-enhancing, from liberty-curtailing, local policy. As a practical matter, doing
so should not be too difficult. Violation by police of a local norm, embodied in a
limit on their authority or a requirement they must satisfy, would suffice. The job of
the judiciary, however, might not always be quite so clear cut. For example, a court
could be faced with a local policy that at once broadens the liberty of some and correspondingly impairs the liberty of others. The Supreme Court has faced the difficulty on several occasions, requiring the balancing of one right against another.425
Precisely how the competing demands would be resolved is beyond the scope of
discussion here, but, as noted, the undertaking is not without judicial precedent.
Finally, the shift would necessitate a change of heart by the Supreme Court, which
has charted an inconsistent course with localism. With programmatic searches and
seizures, such as auto inventories and auto checkpoints, the Court has signaled its
willingness to defer to local policy makers.426 With suspicion-based policing, on the
other hand, the Court has refused to allow application of the Fourth Amendment to
turn on local rules regulating police, deeming them constitutional “trivialities.”427
Aligning the two doctrinal areas would be an added benefit of going local in the
limited manner outlined above.
CONCLUSION
Academic commentary regarding the Fourth Amendment finds itself at a curious
place. Just as the world is becoming increasingly globalized in its orientation, as witnessed in the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law428 and global constitutionalism,429 several leading scholars have argued in favor of localizing the regulation of police search and seizure authority.430 In doing so, they point to a variety of
instrumental benefits, including tailoring of policy to fit the preferences and needs of
local communities, as well as increased governmental transparency, accountability,

425. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (right of state to
bar discrimination outweighs private club’s right to bar women and men over certain age);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (balancing woman’s
right to terminate pregnancy with spouse’s right to exercise veto).
426. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453–54 (1990) (deferring
to “governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources”).
427. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (dismissing importance of local
police violating department regulation that permitted plainclothes officers to execute traffic
stops only in certain situations).
428. See PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NEDELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION
AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 5 (2006).
429. See Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2504 (2005)
(condemning “legal spatiality” for being “at odds with contemporary concepts of jurisdiction,
with the intensifying trend of globalization, and with our most cherished principles of constitutionalism”).
430. With respect to information gathering more generally in the global context, concern
has arisen that reactionary governments indulge in “data localism” to make it easier to get
information on and surveil their citizens. Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data
Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 751–53 (2016).
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experimentation, and civic engagement. Localism, moreover, reflects the practical
reality that local governments dominate the everyday lives of Americans,431 affecting
crucial policy areas such as land use, education, and public safety more generally.
With public safety, however, and Fourth Amendment doctrine limiting police authority in particular, localism presents considerable difficulty. Most problematic is
when local preferences, instantiated in Fourth Amendment doctrinal norms, have liberty-infringing effect. For this reason, if localism is to figure anywhere, it should be
to hold police accountable for violation of locally generated limits on their authority.432 Otherwise, localization of Fourth Amendment doctrine, advanced as a tonic
for current inadequacies of judge-made doctrine, could well be far worse than the
disease itself.

431. See Barron, supra note 25, at 490 (“[O]ur towns and cities are what we know them to
be: important political institutions that are directly responsible for shaping the contours of
‘ordinary civic life in a free society.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)));
Briffault, supra note 191, at 1318 (“In most states, local governments operate in major policy
areas without significant external legislative, administrative, or judicial supervision.”).
432. Indeed, the likelihood of localities, especially large urban municipalities, acting to
expand rights in such a manner could well be on the upswing in response to the increasingly
conservative state and national political landscape. See Corey Brettschneider, Local and State
Government Can Protect the Constitution from Trump, TIME (Nov. 30, 2016), http://
time.com/4584803/donald-trump-states-rights [https://perma.cc/X2SX-VVVY]. Thanks to
Professor Joe Blocher for highlighting this possibility.

